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Single Idea 15241

[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity ]

Full Idea

Humeans say there can be no element of necessity in the causal relation because the conjunction of a description of a cause with the negation of a description of its usual effect is never self-contradictory.

Gist of Idea

Humeans say there is no necessity in causation, because denying an effect is never self-contradictory

Source

Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 3.I)

Book Ref

Harré,R/Madden,E.H.: 'Causal Powers: A Theory of Natural Necessity' [Blackwell 1975], p.45


A Reaction

We might say there actually is a contradiction, because you assert the existence of something, and then deny that existence by denying that the effect could occur. If the object is inert this is wrong, but if it is defined by its powers it is right.


The 26 ideas with the same theme [natural necessity deriving from essences of kinds]:

It is not possible for fire to be cold or snow black [Aristotle]
Boyle and Locke believed corpuscular structures necessitate their powers of interaction [Locke, by Alexander,P]
The corpuscular hypothesis is the best explanation of the necessary connection and co-existence of powers [Locke]
We will only understand substance when we know the necessary connections between powers and qualities [Locke]
For Kant the laws must be necessary, because contingency would destroy representation [Kant, by Meillassoux]
Kant fails to prove the necessity of laws, because his reasoning about chance is over-ambitious [Meillassoux on Kant]
Science confronts the inner necessities of objects [Hegel]
If water is H2O in the actual world, there is no possible world where it isn't H2O [Putnam]
For essentialists, laws of nature are metaphysically necessary, being based on essences of natural kinds [Ellis]
A primary aim of science is to show the limits of the possible [Ellis]
If causal laws describe causal potentialities, the same laws govern properties in all possible worlds [Shoemaker]
If properties are causal, then causal necessity is a species of logical necessity [Shoemaker]
If a world has different causal laws, it must have different properties [Shoemaker]
The scientific discovery (if correct) that gold has atomic number 79 is a necessary truth [Kripke]
Scientific discoveries about gold are necessary truths [Kripke]
Once we've found that heat is molecular motion, then that's what it is, in all possible worlds [Kripke]
Necessary effects will follow from some general theory specifying powers and structure of a world [Harré/Madden]
Humeans say there is no necessity in causation, because denying an effect is never self-contradictory [Harré/Madden]
It is contingent which kinds and powers exist in the world [Molnar]
The necessity of an electron being an electron is conceptual, and won't ground necessary laws [Mumford]
Salt necessarily dissolves in water, because of the law which makes the existence of salt possible [Bird]
If the laws of nature are contingent, shouldn't we already have noticed it? [Meillassoux]
Why are contingent laws of nature stable? [Meillassoux]
There may be necessitation in the world, but causation does not supply it [Mumford/Anjum]
If essence is modal and laws are necessary, essentialist knowledge is found by scientists [Tahko]
Dispositional essentialism allows laws to be different, but only if the supporting properties differ [Vetter]