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Single Idea 15242

[filed under theme 10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention ]

Full Idea

Described as a man it is quite contingent that he has a child, but described as a father it is conceptually necessary that he has a child. But that conceptual necessity is a reflection of the natural necessity of the father's role in reproduction.

Gist of Idea

Having a child is contingent for a 'man', necessary for a 'father'; the latter reflects a necessity of nature

Source

Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 3.I)

Book Ref

Harré,R/Madden,E.H.: 'Causal Powers: A Theory of Natural Necessity' [Blackwell 1975], p.48


A Reaction

This is a (good) response to Quine's claim that necessity depends entirely on the mode of description (and his mathematician cyclist example).

Related Idea

Idea 8482 Mathematicians must be rational but not two-legged, cyclists the opposite. So a mathematical cyclist? [Quine]


The 11 ideas with the same theme [necessity comes from linguistic conventions]:

For each necessity in the world there is an arbitrary rule of language [Wittgenstein]
If natural necessity is used to include or exclude some predicate, the predicate is conceptually necessary [Harré/Madden]
Having a child is contingent for a 'man', necessary for a 'father'; the latter reflects a necessity of nature [Harré/Madden]
A key achievement of Kripke is showing that important modalities are not linguistic in source [Soames]
If necessity rests on linguistic conventions, those are contingent, so there is no necessity [Hale]
If truths are necessary 'by convention', that seems to make them contingent [Sider]
Conventionalism doesn't seem to apply to examples of the necessary a posteriori [Sider]
Necessary a posteriori is conventional for necessity and nonmodal for a posteriority [Sidelle, by Sider]
To know empirical necessities, we need empirical facts, plus conventions about which are necessary [Sidelle]
Conventions can only work if they are based on something non-conventional [Fogelin]
Modal Conventionalism says modality is analytic, not intrinsic to the world, and linguistic [Thomasson]