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Single Idea 15255

[filed under theme 14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction ]

Full Idea

'Going together' is irrelevant as an explanation, and that is precisely why it is useless as a reason for having confidence in inductive inferences.

Gist of Idea

Conjunctions explain nothing, and so do not give a reason for confidence in inductions

Source

Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 4.I)

Book Ref

Harré,R/Madden,E.H.: 'Causal Powers: A Theory of Natural Necessity' [Blackwell 1975], p.71


A Reaction

I suspect that the deep underlying question is whether the actual world has modal features - that is, are dispositions, rather than mere categorical properties, a feature of the actual. Is this room full of possibilities? Yes, say I.


The 32 ideas with the same theme [why induction cannot justify generalised truths]:

We say 'so in cases of this kind', but how do you decide what is 'of this kind'? [Aristotle]
From the fact that some men die, we cannot infer that they all do [Philodemus]
If you don't view every particular, you may miss the one which disproves your universal induction [Sext.Empiricus]
The instances confirming a general truth are never enough to establish its necessity [Leibniz]
Reason cannot show why reliable past experience should extend to future times and remote places [Hume]
Induction can't prove that the future will be like the past, since induction assumes this [Hume]
Fools, children and animals all learn from experience [Hume]
All inferences from experience are effects of custom, not reasoning [Hume]
If we infer causes from repetition, this explains why we infer from a thousand objects what we couldn't infer from one [Hume]
How does induction get started? [Peirce]
Induction can never prove that laws have no exceptions [Peirce]
The worst fallacy in induction is generalising one recondite property from a sample [Peirce]
We can't know if the laws of nature are stable, but we must postulate it or assume it [James]
Chickens are not very good at induction, and are surprised when their feeder wrings their neck [Russell]
It doesn't follow that because the future has always resembled the past, that it always will [Russell]
We can't prove induction from experience without begging the question [Russell]
We can't use the uniformity of nature to prove induction, as that would be circular [Ayer]
There is no such thing as induction [Popper, by Magee]
Induction aims at 'all Fs', but abduction aims at hidden or theoretical entities [Armstrong]
If events are unconnected, then induction cannot be solved [Ellis]
Induction is 'defeasible', since additional information can invalidate it [Harman]
Conjunctions explain nothing, and so do not give a reason for confidence in inductions [Harré/Madden]
Hume's atomic events makes properties independent, and leads to problems with induction [Harré/Madden]
Standard induction does not allow for vertical inferences, to some unobservable lower level [Lipton]
The first million numbers confirm that no number is greater than a million [Kaplan/Kaplan]
Children make errors in induction by focusing too much on categories [Gelman]
Children overestimate the power of a single example [Gelman]
If Hume is right about induction, there is no scientific knowledge [Bird]
Anything justifying inferences from observed to unobserved must itself do that [Bird]
Hume's question is whether experimental science will still be valid tomorrow [Meillassoux]
Maybe induction is only reliable IF reality is stable [Mitchell,A]
Nature is not completely uniform, and some regular causes sometimes fail to produce their effects [Mumford/Anjum]