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Single Idea 15272
[filed under theme 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
]
Full Idea
In being properly critical about the merits of the concept of substance, ...the Humean finds he has lost the vitally important concept of a thing as well.
Gist of Idea
The good criticism of substance by Humeans also loses them the vital concept of a thing
Source
Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 6.IV)
Book Ref
Harré,R/Madden,E.H.: 'Causal Powers: A Theory of Natural Necessity' [Blackwell 1975], p.111
A Reaction
This is the whole reason that Aristotle and others started talking about substances in the first place. The big mistake is to think that Aristotle believes in a thing called 'substance'. The notion is a placeholder for whatever holds a thing together.
The
102 ideas
from Harré,R./Madden,E.H.
15211
|
There is not an exclusive dichotomy between the formal and the logical
[Harré/Madden]
|
15213
|
Causation always involves particular productive things
[Harré/Madden]
|
15209
|
Like disastrous small errors in navigation, small misunderstandings can wreck intellectual life
[Harré/Madden]
|
15212
|
Analysis of concepts based neither on formalism nor psychology can arise from examining what we know
[Harré/Madden]
|
15210
|
Humeans see analysis in terms of formal logic, because necessities are fundamentally logical relations
[Harré/Madden]
|
15215
|
Philosophy devises and assesses conceptual schemes in the service of worldviews
[Harré/Madden]
|
15214
|
Natural necessity is not logical necessity or empirical contingency in disguise
[Harré/Madden]
|
15216
|
Is conceptual necessity just conventional, or does it mirror something about nature?
[Harré/Madden]
|
15217
|
Efficient causes combine stimulus to individuals, absence of contraints on activity
[Harré/Madden]
|
15221
|
The relation between what a thing is and what it can do or undergo relate by natural necessity
[Harré/Madden]
|
15219
|
Essence explains passive capacities as well as active powers
[Harré/Madden]
|
15220
|
To say something remains the same but lacks its capacities and powers seems a contradiction
[Harré/Madden]
|
15222
|
Some individuals can gain or lose capacities or powers, without losing their identity
[Harré/Madden]
|
15218
|
Scientists define copper almost entirely (bar atomic number) in terms of its dispositions
[Harré/Madden]
|
15223
|
Necessary effects will follow from some general theory specifying powers and structure of a world
[Harré/Madden]
|
15224
|
A necessity corresponds to the nature of the actual
[Harré/Madden]
|
15228
|
Necessity and contingency are separate from the a priori and the a posteriori
[Harré/Madden]
|
15225
|
Science investigates the nature and constitution of things or substances
[Harré/Madden]
|
15226
|
What properties a thing must have to be a type of substance can be laid down a priori
[Harré/Madden]
|
15227
|
Logically, definitions have a subject, and a set of necessary predicates
[Harré/Madden]
|
15229
|
We say there is 'no alternative' in all sorts of contexts, and there are many different grounds for it
[Harré/Madden]
|
15233
|
If natural necessity is used to include or exclude some predicate, the predicate is conceptually necessary
[Harré/Madden]
|
15232
|
Natural necessity is when powerful particulars must produce certain results in a situation
[Harré/Madden]
|
15230
|
Logical necessity is grounded in the logical form of a statement
[Harré/Madden]
|
15231
|
Transcendental necessity is conditions of a world required for a rational being to know its nature
[Harré/Madden]
|
15234
|
There is a transcendental necessity for each logical necessity, but the transcendental extends further
[Harré/Madden]
|
15235
|
There is a conceptual necessity when properties become a standard part of a nominal essence
[Harré/Madden]
|
15236
|
Positivism says science only refers to immediate experiences
[Harré/Madden]
|
15239
|
We could call any generalisation a law, if it had reasonable support and no counter-evidence
[Harré/Madden]
|
15240
|
In lawful universal statements (unlike accidental ones) we see why the regularity holds
[Harré/Madden]
|
15237
|
Originally Humeans based lawlike statements on pure qualities, without particulars
[Harré/Madden]
|
15238
|
Being lawlike seems to resist formal analysis, because there are always counter-examples
[Harré/Madden]
|
15241
|
Humeans say there is no necessity in causation, because denying an effect is never self-contradictory
[Harré/Madden]
|
15242
|
Having a child is contingent for a 'man', necessary for a 'father'; the latter reflects a necessity of nature
[Harré/Madden]
|
15252
|
If Goldbach's Conjecture is true (and logically necessary), we may be able to conceive its opposite
[Harré/Madden]
|
15245
|
It is silly to say that direct experience must be justified, either by reason, or by more experience
[Harré/Madden]
|
15248
|
Inference in perception is unconvincingly defended as non-conscious and almost instantaneous
[Harré/Madden]
|
15244
|
We experience qualities as of objects, not on their own
[Harré/Madden]
|
15243
|
We perceive motion, and not just successive occupations of different positions
[Harré/Madden]
|
15253
|
If the concept of a cause includes its usual effects, we call it a 'power'
[Harré/Madden]
|
15246
|
Active causal power is just objects at work, not something existing in itself
[Harré/Madden]
|
15255
|
Conjunctions explain nothing, and so do not give a reason for confidence in inductions
[Harré/Madden]
|
15254
|
If the nature of particulars explains their powers, it also explains their relations and behaviour
[Harré/Madden]
|
15257
|
The induction problem fades if you work with things, rather than with events
[Harré/Madden]
|
15256
|
Humeans cannot step in the same river twice, because they cannot strictly form the concept of 'river'
[Harré/Madden]
|
15258
|
Powers are not qualities; they just point to directions of empirical investigation
[Harré/Madden]
|
15259
|
Chemical atoms have two powers: to enter certain combinations, and to emit a particular spectrum
[Harré/Madden]
|
15260
|
Counterfactuals are just right for analysing statements about the powers which things have
[Harré/Madden]
|
15261
|
Humeans can only explain change with continuity as successive replacement
[Harré/Madden]
|
15262
|
In logic the nature of a kind, substance or individual is the essence which is inseparable from what it is
[Harré/Madden]
|
15264
|
The notorious substratum results from substance-with-qualities; individuals-with-powers solves this
[Harré/Madden]
|
15263
|
Chemistry is not purely structural; CO2 is not the same as SO2
[Harré/Madden]
|
15265
|
'Energy' is a quasi-substance invented as the bearer of change during interactions
[Harré/Madden]
|
15266
|
We say the essence of particles is energy, but only so we can tell a story about the nature of things
[Harré/Madden]
|
15275
|
'Dense' time raises doubts about continuous objects, so they need 'continuous' time
[Harré/Madden]
|
15271
|
If things are successive instantaneous events, nothing requires those events to resemble one another
[Harré/Madden]
|
15272
|
The good criticism of substance by Humeans also loses them the vital concept of a thing
[Harré/Madden]
|
15268
|
Humeans construct their objects from events, but we construct events from objects
[Harré/Madden]
|
15273
|
Points can be 'dense' by unending division, but must meet a tougher criterion to be 'continuous'
[Harré/Madden]
|
15274
|
Points are 'continuous' if any 'cut' point participates in both halves of the cut
[Harré/Madden]
|
15267
|
Events are changes in states of affairs (which consist of structured particulars, with powers and relations)
[Harré/Madden]
|
15279
|
Energy was introduced to physics to refer to the 'store of potency' of a moving ball
[Harré/Madden]
|
15269
|
Humean impressions are too instantaneous and simple to have structure or relations
[Harré/Madden]
|
15270
|
Hume's atomic events makes properties independent, and leads to problems with induction
[Harré/Madden]
|
15280
|
'Kinetic energy' is used to explain the effects of moving things when they are stopped
[Harré/Madden]
|
15278
|
Humean accounts of causal direction by time fail, because cause and effect can occur together
[Harré/Madden]
|
15277
|
The cause (or part of it) is what stimulates or releases the powerful particular thing involved
[Harré/Madden]
|
15276
|
Some powers need a stimulus, but others are just released
[Harré/Madden]
|
15286
|
Clavius's Paradox: purely syntactic entailment theories won't explain, because they are too profuse
[Harré/Madden]
|
15283
|
Simplicity can sort theories out, but still leaves an infinity of possibilities
[Harré/Madden]
|
15285
|
The items put forward by the contraposition belong within different natural clusters
[Harré/Madden]
|
15284
|
Contraposition may be equivalent in truth, but not true in nature, because of irrelevant predicates
[Harré/Madden]
|
15281
|
Humeans see predicates as independent, but science says they are connected
[Harré/Madden]
|
15287
|
The possibility that all ravens are black is a law depends on a mechanism producing the blackness
[Harré/Madden]
|
15288
|
People doubt science because if it isn't logically necessary it seems to be absolutely contingent
[Harré/Madden]
|
15289
|
Property or event relations are naturally necessary if generated by essential mechanisms
[Harré/Madden]
|
15290
|
What reduces the field of the possible is a step towards necessity
[Harré/Madden]
|
15291
|
There is 'absolute' necessity (implied by all propositions) and 'relative' necessity (from what is given)
[Harré/Madden]
|
15293
|
If explanation is by entailment, that lacks a causal direction, unlike natural necessity
[Harré/Madden]
|
15294
|
Powers can explain the direction of causality, and make it a natural necessity
[Harré/Madden]
|
15292
|
We can base the idea of a natural kind on the mechanisms that produce natural necessity
[Harré/Madden]
|
15295
|
Theism is supposed to make the world more intelligible - and should offer results
[Harré/Madden]
|
15296
|
A particular might change all of its characteristics, retaining mere numerical identity
[Harré/Madden]
|
15297
|
We can infer a new property of a thing from its other properties, via its essential nature
[Harré/Madden]
|
15298
|
We prefer the theory which explains and predicts the powers and capacities of particulars
[Harré/Madden]
|
15300
|
Fundamental particulars can't change
[Harré/Madden]
|
15299
|
Species do not have enough constancy to be natural kinds
[Harré/Madden]
|
15301
|
The very concepts of a particular power or nature imply the possibility of being generalised
[Harré/Madden]
|
15302
|
We explain powers by the natures of things, but explanations end in inexplicable powers
[Harré/Madden]
|
15303
|
Maybe a physical field qualifies as ultimate, if its nature is identical with its powers
[Harré/Madden]
|
15304
|
We can escape substance and its properties, if we take fields of pure powers as ultimate
[Harré/Madden]
|
15305
|
Some powers are variable, others cannot change (without destroying an identity)
[Harré/Madden]
|
15306
|
Only changes require explanation
[Harré/Madden]
|
15309
|
The assumption that shape and solidity are fundamental implies dubious 'substance' in bodies
[Harré/Madden]
|
15310
|
Solidity comes from the power of repulsion, and shape from the power of attraction
[Harré/Madden]
|
15315
|
What is a field of potentials, if it only consists of possible events?
[Harré/Madden]
|
15318
|
Gravitational and electrical fields are, for a materialist, distressingly empty of material
[Harré/Madden]
|
15316
|
The powers/natures approach has been so successful (for electricity, magnetism, gravity) it may be universal
[Harré/Madden]
|
15317
|
Powers and natures lead us to hypothesise underlying mechanisms, which may be real
[Harré/Madden]
|
15319
|
Hard individual blocks don't fix what 'things' are; fluids are no less material things
[Harré/Madden]
|
15320
|
Magnetic and gravity fields can occupy the same place without merging
[Harré/Madden]
|
15321
|
Space can't be an individual (in space), but it is present in all places
[Harré/Madden]
|