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Single Idea 15277

[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause ]

Full Idea

We can unambiguously differentiate the cause from the effect in that whatever stimulates or releases the action of the powerful particular involved in the causal production is the cause or part of the cause of that effect.

Gist of Idea

The cause (or part of it) is what stimulates or releases the powerful particular thing involved

Source

Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 6.IV)

Book Ref

Harré,R/Madden,E.H.: 'Causal Powers: A Theory of Natural Necessity' [Blackwell 1975], p.114

A Reaction

I have doubts about distinguishing stimulus from release, and they sensibly don't say they have a test for 'the' cause, but I roughly agree with this idea. I take 'the' cause to also be tied in with explanation.

The 14 ideas with the same theme [naming 'the' cause among the pre-condtions of events]:

10391 Causes and conditions are not distinct, because we select capriciously from among them [Mill]
14547 The strict cause is the total positive and negative conditions which ensure the consequent [Mill]
22645 Understanding by means of causes is useless if they are not reduced to a minimum number [James]
8370 A cause is a change which occurs close to the effect and just before it [Ducasse]
17645 An alien might think oxygen was the main cause of a forest fire [Putnam]
8333 A cause is an Insufficient but Necessary part of an Unnecessary but Sufficient condition [Mackie]
15277 The cause (or part of it) is what stimulates or releases the powerful particular thing involved [Harré/Madden]
15551 Ways of carving causes may be natural, but never 'right' [Lewis]
15552 We only pick 'the' cause for the purposes of some particular enquiry. [Lewis]
10392 It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause [Lewis]
8419 The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions [Lewis]
10393 Our selection of 'the' cause is very predictable, so must have a basis [Schaffer,J]
10394 Selecting 'the' cause must have a basis; there is no causation without such a selection [Schaffer,J]
14567 Privileging one cause is just an epistemic or pragmatic matter, not an ontological one [Mumford/Anjum]