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Single Idea 15323
[filed under theme 3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
]
Full Idea
I take truth to be a property because the truth predicate has an extension - the collection of all true sentences - and this collection does not (unlike the 'extension' of 'exists') consist of everything, or even of all sentences.
Gist of Idea
Truth is a property, because the truth predicate has an extension
Source
Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 01.1)
Book Ref
Horsten,Leon: 'The Tarskian Turn' [MIT 2011], p.2
A Reaction
He concedes that it may be an 'uninteresting' property. My problem is always that I am unconvinced that truth is tied to sentences. I can make perfect sense of animal thoughts being right or wrong. Extension of mental propositions?
Related Idea
Idea 5420
Truth is a property of a belief, but dependent on its external relations, not its internal qualities [Russell]
The
31 ideas
with the same theme
[whether truth exists, and what it is in general]:
10913
|
Truth is a matter of asserting correct combinations and separations
[Aristotle]
|
10914
|
Simple and essential truth seems to be given, with further truth arising in thinking
[Aristotle]
|
10916
|
Truth is either intuiting a way of being, or a putting together
[Aristotle]
|
5728
|
The concept of truth was originated by the senses
[Lucretius]
|
2673
|
There cannot be more than one truth
[Cicero]
|
4748
|
Anselm of Canterbury identified truth with God
[Anselm, by Engel]
|
23176
|
Truth is universal, but knowledge of it is not
[Aquinas]
|
20621
|
Types of lying: Speak lies, intend lies, intend deception, aim at deceptive goal?
[Aquinas, by Tuckness/Wolf]
|
21864
|
Truth is its own standard
[Spinoza]
|
19333
|
A truth is just a proposition in which the predicate is contained within the subject
[Leibniz]
|
12910
|
The predicate is in the subject of a true proposition
[Leibniz]
|
8098
|
Truth consists of having the same idea about something that God has
[Joubert]
|
5420
|
Truth is a property of a belief, but dependent on its external relations, not its internal qualities
[Russell]
|
21953
|
For Heidegger there is 'ontic' truth or 'uncoveredness', as in "he is a true friend"
[Heidegger, by Wrathall]
|
23884
|
Truth is a value of thought
[Weil]
|
15471
|
Truth is a relation between a representation ('bearer') and part of the world ('truthmaker')
[Martin,CB]
|
6276
|
'The rug is green' might be warrantedly assertible even though the rug is not green
[Putnam]
|
4714
|
Putnam's epistemic notion of truth replaces the realism of correspondence with ontological relativism
[Putnam, by O'Grady]
|
10837
|
It is part of the concept of truth that we aim at making true statements
[Dummett]
|
6396
|
A sentence is held true because of a combination of meaning and belief
[Davidson]
|
8820
|
Rules of reasoning precede the concept of truth, and they are what characterize it
[Pollock]
|
6334
|
The function of the truth predicate? Understanding 'true'? Meaning of 'true'? The concept of truth? A theory of truth?
[Horwich]
|
3883
|
A true proposition is consistent with every other true proposition
[Scruton]
|
4701
|
To say a relative truth is inexpressible in other frameworks is 'weak', while saying it is false is 'strong'
[O'Grady]
|
4703
|
The epistemic theory of truth presents it as 'that which is licensed by our best theory of reality'
[O'Grady]
|
13252
|
Some truths have true negations
[Beall/Restall]
|
15323
|
Truth is a property, because the truth predicate has an extension
[Horsten]
|
15324
|
Semantic theories of truth seek models; axiomatic (syntactic) theories seek logical principles
[Horsten]
|
16330
|
Truth-value 'gluts' allow two truth values together; 'gaps' give a partial conception of truth
[Halbach]
|
16339
|
Truth axioms prove objects exist, so truth doesn't seem to be a logical notion
[Halbach]
|
18819
|
The idea that there are unrecognised truths is basic to our concept of truth
[Rumfitt]
|