more from this thinker | more from this text
Full Idea
Modern correspondence theorists no longer take things to correspond to true propositions; they consider facts to be the truthmakers of propositions.
Gist of Idea
Modern correspondence is said to be with the facts, not with true propositions
Source
Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 02.1)
Book Ref
Horsten,Leon: 'The Tarskian Turn' [MIT 2011], p.12
A Reaction
If we then define facts as the way certain things are, independently from our thinking about it, at least we seem to be avoiding circularity. Not much point in correspondence accounts if you are not a robust realist (like me). [14,000th idea, 23/4/12!]
| 20780 | Graspable presentations are criteria of facts, and are molded according to their objects [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 23483 | Proposition elements correlate with objects, but the whole picture does not correspond to a fact [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M] |
| 13985 | A true proposition seems true of one fact, but a false proposition seems true of nothing at all. [Ryle] |
| 10843 | Facts aren't exactly true statements, but they are what those statements say [Strawson,P] |
| 10842 | The fact which is stated by a true sentence is not something in the world [Strawson,P] |
| 13469 | Tarski showed how we could have a correspondence theory of truth, without using 'facts' [Hart,WD] |
| 10355 | Facts can't make claims true, because they are true claims [Brandom, by Kusch] |
| 8315 | Maybe facts are just true propositions [Lowe] |
| 18357 | What makes a disjunction true is simpler than the disjunctive fact it names [David] |
| 18359 | One proposition can be made true by many different facts [David] |
| 4750 | The redundancy theory gets rid of facts, for 'it is a fact that p' just means 'p' [Engel] |
| 15333 | Modern correspondence is said to be with the facts, not with true propositions [Horsten] |
| 17740 | Instead of correspondence of proposition to fact, look at correspondence of its parts [Jenkins] |