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Single Idea 15335

[filed under theme 3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth ]

Full Idea

Peirce's anti-realist theory of a truth is a verificationist theory. Truth is judged to be an epistemic notion. But the way things are is independent of the evidence we may be able to obtain for or against a judgement.

Gist of Idea

Peirce's theory offers anti-realist verificationism, but surely how things are is independent of us?

Source

comment on Charles Sanders Peirce (Pragmatism in Retrospect [1906]) by Leon Horsten - The Tarskian Turn 02.1

Book Ref

Horsten,Leon: 'The Tarskian Turn' [MIT 2011], p.13


A Reaction

This criticism doesn't quite capture the point that Peirce's theory is that truth is an ideal, not the set of opinions that miserable little humans eventually settle for when they get bored. Truth is an aspect of rationality, perhaps.


The 24 ideas with the same theme [truth as the aim of enquiry]:

Delusion and truth differ in their life functions [Novalis]
Truth is the opinion fated to be ultimately agreed by all investigators [Peirce]
Peirce's theory offers anti-realist verificationism, but surely how things are is independent of us? [Horsten on Peirce]
Independent truth (if there is any) is the ultimate result of sufficient enquiry [Peirce]
'Holding for true' is either practical commitment, or provisional theory [Peirce]
Pragmatic 'truth' is a term to cover the many varied aims of enquiry [Peirce, by Misak]
Peirce did not think a belief was true if it was useful [Peirce, by Misak]
If truth is the end of enquiry, what if it never ends, or ends prematurely? [Atkin on Peirce]
If the hypothesis of God is widely successful, it is true [James]
True ideas are those we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify (and false otherwise) [James]
Truth is an idealisation of rational acceptability [Putnam]
Truth is rational acceptability [Putnam]
For James truth is "what it is better for us to believe" rather than a correct picture of reality [Rorty]
Maybe James was depicting the value of truth, and not its nature [Nozick]
The pragmatist does not really have a theory of truth [Scruton]
Radical pragmatists abandon the notion of truth [Stich, by Lowe]
Does the pragmatic theory of meaning support objective truth, or make it impossible? [Macbeth]
The pragmatic theory of truth is relative; useful for group A can be useless for group B [Horsten]
For pragmatists the loftiest idea of truth is just a feature of what remains forever assertible [Misak]
Truth makes disagreements matter, or worth settling [Misak]
'True' is used for emphasis, clarity, assertion, comparison, objectivity, meaning, negation, consequence... [Misak]
'That's true' doesn't just refer back to a sentence, but implies sustained evidence for it [Misak]
Truth isn't a grand elusive property, if it is just the aim of our assertions and inquiries [Misak]
Truth is proper assertion, but that has varying standards [Misak]