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Single Idea 15365
[filed under theme 3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
]
Full Idea
The truth predicate, says Tarski, should be defined in terms of the more primitive satisfaction relation: the relation of being 'true of'. The fundamental notion is a formula (containing the free variables) being true of a sequence of objects as values.
Gist of Idea
We can define the truth predicate using 'true of' (satisfaction) for variables and some objects
Source
report of Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by Leon Horsten - The Tarskian Turn 06.3
Book Ref
Horsten,Leon: 'The Tarskian Turn' [MIT 2011], p.74
The
36 ideas
from 'The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages'
15339
|
Tarski gave up on the essence of truth, and asked how truth is used, or how it functions
[Tarski, by Horsten]
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16302
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Tarski did not just aim at a definition; he also offered an adequacy criterion for any truth definition
[Tarski, by Halbach]
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19135
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Tarski enumerates cases of truth, so it can't be applied to new words or languages
[Davidson on Tarski]
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19138
|
Tarski define truths by giving the extension of the predicate, rather than the meaning
[Davidson on Tarski]
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4699
|
Tarski made truth relative, by only defining truth within some given artificial language
[Tarski, by O'Grady]
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19324
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Tarski has to avoid stating how truths relate to states of affairs
[Kirkham on Tarski]
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16296
|
Tarski's Theorem renders any precise version of correspondence impossible
[Tarski, by Halbach]
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10672
|
Tarskian semantics says that a sentence is true iff it is satisfied by every sequence
[Tarski, by Hossack]
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10969
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Tarski had a theory of truth, and a theory of theories of truth
[Tarski, by Read]
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17746
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Tarski's 'truth' is a precise relation between the language and its semantics
[Tarski, by Walicki]
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10904
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Tarskian truth neglects the atomic sentences
[Mulligan/Simons/Smith on Tarski]
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15410
|
Truth only applies to closed formulas, but we need satisfaction of open formulas to define it
[Burgess on Tarski]
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18811
|
Tarski uses sentential functions; truly assigning the objects to variables is what satisfies them
[Tarski, by Rumfitt]
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15365
|
We can define the truth predicate using 'true of' (satisfaction) for variables and some objects
[Tarski, by Horsten]
|
19314
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For physicalism, reduce truth to satisfaction, then define satisfaction as physical-plus-logic
[Tarski, by Kirkham]
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19316
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Insight: don't use truth, use a property which can be compositional in complex quantified sentence
[Tarski, by Kirkham]
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19175
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Tarski gave axioms for satisfaction, then derived its explicit definition, which led to defining truth
[Tarski, by Davidson]
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16303
|
Tarski made truth respectable, by proving that it could be defined
[Tarski, by Halbach]
|
19134
|
Tarski defined truth for particular languages, but didn't define it across languages
[Davidson on Tarski]
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16304
|
Tarski didn't capture the notion of an adequate truth definition, as Convention T won't prove non-contradiction
[Halbach on Tarski]
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2571
|
Tarski says that his semantic theory of truth is completely neutral about all metaphysics
[Tarski, by Haack]
|
10821
|
Physicalists should explain reference nonsemantically, rather than getting rid of it
[Tarski, by Field,H]
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10822
|
A physicalist account must add primitive reference to Tarski's theory
[Field,H on Tarski]
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15322
|
Tarski's had the first axiomatic theory of truth that was minimally adequate
[Tarski, by Horsten]
|
16306
|
Tarski defined truth, but an axiomatisation can be extracted from his inductive clauses
[Tarski, by Halbach]
|
18759
|
Identity is invariant under arbitrary permutations, so it seems to be a logical term
[Tarski, by McGee]
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16323
|
The object language/ metalanguage distinction is the basis of model theory
[Tarski, by Halbach]
|
18756
|
Tarski built a compositional semantics for predicate logic, from dependent satisfactions
[Tarski, by McGee]
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19313
|
Tarksi invented the first semantics for predicate logic, using this conception of truth
[Tarski, by Kirkham]
|
8940
|
Tarski avoids the Liar Paradox, because truth cannot be asserted within the object language
[Tarski, by Fisher]
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10154
|
Tarski's theory of truth shifted the approach away from syntax, to set theory and semantics
[Feferman/Feferman on Tarski]
|
20407
|
Taste is the capacity to judge an object or representation which is thought to be beautiful
[Tarski, by Schellekens]
|
16295
|
Tarski proved that truth cannot be defined from within a given theory
[Tarski, by Halbach]
|
15342
|
Tarski proved that any reasonably expressive language suffers from the liar paradox
[Tarski, by Horsten]
|
19069
|
'True sentence' has no use consistent with logic and ordinary language, so definition seems hopeless
[Tarski]
|
10823
|
A name denotes an object if the object satisfies a particular sentential function
[Tarski]
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