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Single Idea 15387

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism ]

Full Idea

Scotus argued that there must be some non-singular aspects of things, since there are some 'less than numerical differences' among them. A horse and a tulip differ more from each other than do two horses.

Gist of Idea

If things were singular they would only differ numerically, but horse and tulip differ more than that

Source

report of John Duns Scotus (Ordinatio [1302]) by Claude Panaccio - Medieval Problem of Universals 'John Duns'

Book Ref

'Routledge Companion to Metaphysics', ed/tr. Le Poidevin/Simons etc [Routledge 2012], p.53


A Reaction

This seems to treat being 'singular' as if it were being a singularity. Presumably he is contemplating a thing being nothing but its Scotist haecceity. A neat argument, but I don't buy it.


The 17 ideas with the same theme [general ideas about nominalism]:

If only the singular exists, science is impossible, as that relies on true generalities [Duns Scotus, by Panaccio]
If things were singular they would only differ numerically, but horse and tulip differ more than that [Duns Scotus, by Panaccio]
Only individual bodies exist [Bacon]
Obviously 'Socrates is wise' and 'Socrates has wisdom' express the same fact [Ramsey]
I am a deeply convinced nominalist [Tarski]
Refusal to explain why different tokens are of the same type is to be an ostrich [Armstrong]
Nominalism only makes sense if it is materialist [Putnam]
'Nominalism' used to mean denial of universals, but now means denial of abstract objects [Dummett]
Nominalism assumes unmediated mental contact with objects [Dummett]
For nominalists, predicate extensions are inexplicable facts [Molnar]
Nominalists only accept first-order logic [Molnar]
Nominalism can reject abstractions, or universals, or sets [Oliver]
Nominalists are motivated by Ockham's Razor and a distrust of unobservables [Hoffman/Rosenkrantz]
Austere nominalism has to take a host of things (like being red, or human) as primitive [Loux]
Nominalists suspect that properties etc are our projections, and could have been different [Williamson]
A 'porridge' nominalist thinks we just divide reality in any way that suits us [Mumford]
Moderate nominalism attempts to embrace the existence of properties while avoiding universals [Moreland]