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Single Idea 15388
[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
]
Full Idea
Every universal is one particular thing and it is not a universal except in its signification, in its signifying many thing.
Gist of Idea
Universals are single things, and only universal in what they signify
Source
William of Ockham (Summa totius logicae [1323]), quoted by Claude Panaccio - Medieval Problem of Universals 'William'
Book Ref
'Routledge Companion to Metaphysics', ed/tr. Le Poidevin/Simons etc [Routledge 2012], p.55
A Reaction
Sounds as if William might have liked tropes. It seems to leave the problem unanswered (the 'ostrich' problem?). How are they able to signify in this universal way, if each thing is just distinct and particular?
The
16 ideas
with the same theme
[denial of the real existence of universals]:
5869
|
The thesis of the Form of the Good (or of anything else) is verbal and vacuous
[Aristotle]
|
10396
|
If 'animal' is wholly present in Socrates and an ass, then 'animal' is rational and irrational
[Abelard, by King,P]
|
10395
|
Abelard was an irrealist about virtually everything apart from concrete individuals
[Abelard, by King,P]
|
9103
|
A universal is not a real feature of objects, but only a thought-object in the mind
[William of Ockham]
|
15388
|
Universals are single things, and only universal in what they signify
[William of Ockham]
|
17247
|
The only generalities or universals are names or signs
[Hobbes]
|
7717
|
All things that exist are particulars
[Locke]
|
7718
|
Universals do not exist, but are useful inventions of the mind, involving words or ideas
[Locke]
|
6715
|
Universals do not have single meaning, but attach to many different particulars
[Berkeley]
|
6719
|
No one will think of abstractions if they only have particular ideas
[Berkeley]
|
23650
|
Only individuals exist
[Reid]
|
9006
|
Commitment to universals is as arbitrary or pragmatic as the adoption of a new system of bookkeeping
[Quine]
|
15402
|
There is no entity called 'redness', and that some things are red is ultimate and irreducible
[Quine]
|
8576
|
The One over Many problem (in predication terms) deserves to be neglected (by ostriches)
[Lewis]
|
8503
|
The particular/universal distinction is unhelpful clutter; we should accept 'a is F' as basic
[Devitt]
|
4232
|
Nominalists believe that only particulars exist
[Lowe]
|