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Single Idea 15394
[filed under theme 3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / c. States of affairs make truths
]
Full Idea
The most popular view is that an object is a truthmaker if the object couldn't exist and the truth be false. But contingent predications are also held to need truthmakers. Socrates is not necessarily snub-nosed, so a trope or state of affairs is needed.
Gist of Idea
Truthmaker requires a commitment to tropes or states of affairs, for contingent truths
Source
Ross P. Cameron (Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties [2009], 'Truthmakers')
Book Ref
'Routledge Companion to Metaphysics', ed/tr. Le Poidevin/Simons etc [Routledge 2012], p.267
A Reaction
Cameron calls this 'some heavy ontological commitments'. If snub-nosedness is necessitated by the trope of 'being snub-nosed', what is the truthmaker for Socrates having that trope?
The
31 ideas
from Ross P. Cameron
15401
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Essentialists say intrinsic properties arise from what the thing is, irrespective of surroundings
[Cameron]
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15393
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An object's intrinsic properties are had in virtue of how it is, independently
[Cameron]
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15396
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Most criteria for identity over time seem to leave two later objects identical to the earlier one
[Cameron]
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15395
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Give up objects necessitating truths, and say their natures cause the truths?
[Cameron]
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15394
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Truthmaker requires a commitment to tropes or states of affairs, for contingent truths
[Cameron]
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15102
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S4 says there must be some necessary truths (the actual ones, of which there is at least one)
[Cameron]
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15103
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Blackburn fails to show that the necessary cannot be grounded in the contingent
[Cameron]
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15104
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The 'moving spotlight' theory makes one time privileged, while all times are on a par ontologically
[Cameron]
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18881
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For realists it is analytic that truths are grounded in the world
[Cameron]
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18879
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What the proposition says may not be its truthmaker
[Cameron]
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18880
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Rather than what exists, some claim that the truthmakers are ways of existence, dispositions, modalities etc
[Cameron]
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18868
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Surely if some propositions are grounded in existence, they all are?
[Cameron]
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18867
|
Orthodox Truthmaker applies to all propositions, and necessitates their truth
[Cameron]
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18873
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God fixes all the truths of the world by fixing what exists
[Cameron]
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18869
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Without truthmakers, negative truths must be ungrounded
[Cameron]
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18872
|
We should reject distinct but indiscernible worlds
[Cameron]
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18871
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I support the correspondence theory because I believe in truthmakers
[Cameron]
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18870
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Maybe truthmaking and correspondence stand together, and are interdefinable
[Cameron]
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18875
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Realism says a discourse is true or false, and some of it is true
[Cameron]
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18878
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Realism says truths rest on mind-independent reality; truthmaking theories are about which features
[Cameron]
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18877
|
Moral realism doesn't seem to entail the existence of any things
[Cameron]
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18874
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Truthmaking doesn't require realism, because we can be anti-realist about truthmakers
[Cameron]
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18923
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The present property 'having been F' says nothing about a thing's intrinsic nature
[Cameron]
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18924
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Being polka-dotted is a 'spatial distribution' property
[Cameron]
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18930
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Change is instantiation of a non-uniform distributional property, like 'being red-then-orange'
[Cameron]
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18927
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Surely if things extend over time, then time itself must be extended?
[Cameron]
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18926
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One temporal distibution property grounds our present and past truths
[Cameron]
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18929
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We don't want present truthmakers for the past, if they are about to cease to exist!
[Cameron]
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18928
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If maximalism is necessary, then that nothing exists has a truthmaker, which it can't have
[Cameron]
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18932
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The facts about the existence of truthmakers can't have a further explanation
[Cameron]
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18931
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Determinate truths don't need extra truthmakers, just truthmakers that are themselves determinate
[Cameron]
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