more from this thinker     |     more from this text


Single Idea 15399

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets ]

Full Idea

Lewis thought that the property of being F was identical with the set of objects, in all possible worlds, which are F.

Gist of Idea

The property of being F is identical with the set of objects, in all possible worlds, which are F

Source

report of David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], §1.5) by Ross P. Cameron - Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties

Book Ref

'Routledge Companion to Metaphysics', ed/tr. Le Poidevin/Simons etc [Routledge 2012], p.269


A Reaction

I can't make head or tail of a theory which says that a property is a set of objects. I'll show you a room full of objects and tell you they are a property. How are you going to work out what the property is? 'Being F' is a predicate, not a property!


The 22 ideas with the same theme [properties are just classes of certain objects]:

When we attribute a common quality to a group, we can forget the quality and just talk of the group [Russell]
Russell refuted Frege's principle that there is a set for each property [Russell, by Sorensen]
Properties are the respects in which objects resemble, which places them in classes [Martin,CB]
Properties and relations are discovered, so they can't be mere sets of individuals [Ellis]
Treating predicates as sets drops the predicate for a new predicate 'is a member of', which is no help [Davidson]
While no two classes coincide in membership, there are distinct but coextensive attributes [Cartwright,R]
The property of being F is identical with the set of objects, in all possible worlds, which are F [Lewis, by Cameron]
Properties don't seem to be sets, because different properties can have the same set [Lewis]
Accidentally coextensive properties come apart when we include their possible instances [Lewis]
If a property is relative, such as being a father or son, then set membership seems relative too [Lewis]
Trilateral and triangular seem to be coextensive sets in all possible worlds [Lewis]
It would be easiest to take a property as the set of its instances [Lewis]
A property is the set of its actual and possible instances [Lewis, by Oliver]
I believe in properties, which are sets of possible individuals [Lewis]
A property is any class of possibilia [Lewis]
Properties are sets of their possible instances (which separates 'renate' from 'cordate') [Lewis, by Mellor/Oliver]
Properties are classes of possible and actual concrete particulars [Lewis, by Koslicki]
If classes can't be eliminated, and they are property combinations, then properties (universals) can't be either [Jacquette]
Properties have causal roles which sets can't possibly have [Heil]
Logicians use 'property' and 'set' interchangeably, with little hanging on it [Shapiro]
Construct properties as sets of objects, or say an object must be in the set to have the property [Linsky,B]
The best-known candidate for an identity condition for properties is necessary coextensiveness [Swoyer]