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Single Idea 15402

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals ]

Full Idea

There is not any entity whatever, individual or otherwise, which is named by the word 'redness'. ...That the houses and roses and sunsets are all of them red may be taken as ultimate and irreducible.

Gist of Idea

There is no entity called 'redness', and that some things are red is ultimate and irreducible

Source

Willard Quine (On What There Is [1948], p.10)

Book Ref

Quine,Willard: 'From a Logical Point of View' [Harper and Row 1963], p.10

A Reaction

This seems to invite the 'ostrich' charge (Armstrong), that there is something left over that needs explaining. If the reds are ultimate and irreducible, that seems to imply that they have no relationship at all to one another.

The 16 ideas with the same theme [denial of the real existence of universals]:

5869 The thesis of the Form of the Good (or of anything else) is verbal and vacuous [Aristotle]
10396 If 'animal' is wholly present in Socrates and an ass, then 'animal' is rational and irrational [Abelard, by King,P]
10395 Abelard was an irrealist about virtually everything apart from concrete individuals [Abelard, by King,P]
9103 A universal is not a real feature of objects, but only a thought-object in the mind [William of Ockham]
15388 Universals are single things, and only universal in what they signify [William of Ockham]
17247 The only generalities or universals are names or signs [Hobbes]
7717 All things that exist are particulars [Locke]
7718 Universals do not exist, but are useful inventions of the mind, involving words or ideas [Locke]
6715 Universals do not have single meaning, but attach to many different particulars [Berkeley]
6719 No one will think of abstractions if they only have particular ideas [Berkeley]
23650 Only individuals exist [Reid]
9006 Commitment to universals is as arbitrary or pragmatic as the adoption of a new system of bookkeeping [Quine]
15402 There is no entity called 'redness', and that some things are red is ultimate and irreducible [Quine]
8576 The One over Many problem (in predication terms) deserves to be neglected (by ostriches) [Lewis]
8503 The particular/universal distinction is unhelpful clutter; we should accept 'a is F' as basic [Devitt]
4232 Nominalists believe that only particulars exist [Lowe]