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Single Idea 15410

[filed under theme 3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth ]

Full Idea

In Tarski's theory of truth, although the notion of truth is applicable only to closed formulas, to define it we must define a more general notion of satisfaction applicable to open formulas.

Gist of Idea

Truth only applies to closed formulas, but we need satisfaction of open formulas to define it

Source

comment on Alfred Tarski (The Concept of Truth for Formalized Languages [1933]) by John P. Burgess - Philosophical Logic 1.8

Book Ref

Burgess,John P.: 'Philosophical Logic' [Princeton 2009], p.9


A Reaction

This is a helpful pointer to what is going on in the Tarski definition. It culminates in the 'satisfaction of all sequences', which presumable delivers the required closed formula.


The 18 ideas with the same theme ['satisfaction' as a means of defining truth]:

An argument 'satisfies' a function φx if φa is true [Russell]
The best truth definition involves other semantic notions, like satisfaction (relating terms and objects) [Tarski]
Specify satisfaction for simple sentences, then compounds; true sentences are satisfied by all objects [Tarski]
Truth only applies to closed formulas, but we need satisfaction of open formulas to define it [Burgess on Tarski]
Tarski uses sentential functions; truly assigning the objects to variables is what satisfies them [Tarski, by Rumfitt]
We can define the truth predicate using 'true of' (satisfaction) for variables and some objects [Tarski, by Horsten]
For physicalism, reduce truth to satisfaction, then define satisfaction as physical-plus-logic [Tarski, by Kirkham]
Insight: don't use truth, use a property which can be compositional in complex quantified sentence [Tarski, by Kirkham]
Tarski gave axioms for satisfaction, then derived its explicit definition, which led to defining truth [Tarski, by Davidson]
We can explain truth in terms of satisfaction - but also explain satisfaction in terms of truth [Davidson]
Satisfaction is a sort of reference, so maybe we can define truth in terms of reference? [Davidson]
Axioms spell out sentence satisfaction. With no free variables, all sequences satisfy the truths [Davidson]
Tarski just reduced truth to some other undefined semantic notions [Field,H]
A 'sequence' of objects is an order set of them [Kirkham]
If one sequence satisfies a sentence, they all do [Kirkham]
Truth for sentences is satisfaction of formulae; for sentences, either all sequences satisfy it (true) or none do [Hart,WD]
Satisfaction is 'truth in a model', which is a model of 'truth' [Shapiro]
If a language cannot name all objects, then satisfaction must be used, instead of unary truth [Halbach/Leigh]