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Single Idea 15431

[filed under theme 4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 2. Intuitionist Logic ]

Full Idea

The question of the completeness of the full intuitionistic logic for its intended interpretation is not yet fully resolved.

Clarification

'Complete' means all its truths can be proved

Gist of Idea

It is still unsettled whether standard intuitionist logic is complete

Source

John P. Burgess (Philosophical Logic [2009], 6.9)

Book Ref

Burgess,John P.: 'Philosophical Logic' [Princeton 2009], p.141

The 15 ideas with the same theme [logic which uses 'provable' in place of 'true']:

18832 Mathematical statements and entities that result from an infinite process must lack a truth-value [Dummett]
18073 Dummett says classical logic rests on meaning as truth, while intuitionist logic rests on assertability [Dummett, by Kitcher]
18122 Classical interdefinitions of logical constants and quantifiers is impossible in intuitionism [Bostock]
18074 Intuitionists rely on assertability instead of truth, but assertability relies on truth [Kitcher]
15430 Is classical logic a part of intuitionist logic, or vice versa? [Burgess]
15431 It is still unsettled whether standard intuitionist logic is complete [Burgess]
13715 You can employ intuitionist logic without intuitionism about mathematics [Sider]
18789 Intuitionist logic looks best as natural deduction [Mares]
18790 Intuitionism as natural deduction has no rule for negation [Mares]
13249 (∀x)(A v B) |- (∀x)A v (∃x)B) is valid in classical logic but invalid intuitionistically [Beall/Restall]
8708 Double negation elimination is not valid in intuitionist logic [Friend]
17925 Showing a disproof is impossible is not a proof, so don't eliminate double negation [Colyvan]
17926 Rejecting double negation elimination undermines reductio proofs [Colyvan]
18798 It is the second-order part of intuitionistic logic which actually negates some classical theorems [Rumfitt]
18799 Intuitionists can accept Double Negation Elimination for decidable propositions [Rumfitt]