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Single Idea 15433

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes ]

Full Idea

Tropes are supposed to be particularized properties: nonspatiotemporal parts of their instances which cannot occur repeatedly, but can be exact duplicates.

Gist of Idea

Tropes are particular properties, which cannot recur, but can be exact duplicates

Source

David Lewis (Against Structural Universals [1986], 'Intro')

Book Ref

Lewis,David: 'Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology' [CUP 1999], p.79

A Reaction

Russell's objection is that 'duplication' appears to be a non-trope universal. The account seems wrong for very close resemblance, which is accepted by everyone as being the same (e.g. in colour, for football shirts).

The 17 ideas from 'Against Structural Universals'

15433 Tropes are particular properties, which cannot recur, but can be exact duplicates [Lewis]
15448 The 'magical' view of structural universals says they are atoms, even though they have parts [Lewis]
15449 If 'methane' is an atomic structural universal, it has nothing to connect it to its carbon universals [Lewis]
15439 The 'pictorial' view of structural universals says they are wholes made of universals as parts [Lewis]
15441 The structural universal 'methane' needs the universal 'hydrogen' four times over [Lewis]
15440 A whole is distinct from its parts, but is not a further addition in ontology [Lewis]
15443 Mathematicians abstract by equivalence classes, but that doesn't turn a many into one [Lewis]
15450 Maybe abstraction is just mereological subtraction [Lewis]
15451 I assume there could be natural properties that are not instantiated in our world [Lewis]
15445 Butane and Isobutane have the same atoms, but different structures [Lewis]
15446 Composition is not just making new things from old; there are too many counterexamples [Lewis]
15444 Different things (a toy house and toy car) can be made of the same parts at different times [Lewis]
15434 Structural universals have a necessary connection to the universals forming its parts [Lewis]
15437 We can't get rid of structural universals if there are no simple universals [Lewis]
15435 If you think universals are immanent, you must believe them to be sparse, and not every related predicate [Lewis]
15436 Universals are meant to give an account of resemblance [Lewis]
15438 We can add a primitive natural/unnatural distinction to class nominalism [Lewis]