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Single Idea 15440
[filed under theme 9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
]
Full Idea
A whole is an extra item in our ontology only in the minimal sense that it is not identical to any of its proper parts; but it is not distinct from them either, so when we believe in the parts it is no extra burden to believe in the whole.
Gist of Idea
A whole is distinct from its parts, but is not a further addition in ontology
Source
David Lewis (Against Structural Universals [1986], 'The pictorial')
Book Ref
Lewis,David: 'Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology' [CUP 1999], p.91
A Reaction
A little confusing, to be 'not identical' and yet 'not different'. As Lewis says elsewhere, the whole is one, and the parts are not. A crux. Essentialism implies a sort of holism, that parts with a structure constitute a new thing.
The
17 ideas
from 'Against Structural Universals'
15433
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Tropes are particular properties, which cannot recur, but can be exact duplicates
[Lewis]
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15448
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The 'magical' view of structural universals says they are atoms, even though they have parts
[Lewis]
|
15449
|
If 'methane' is an atomic structural universal, it has nothing to connect it to its carbon universals
[Lewis]
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15439
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The 'pictorial' view of structural universals says they are wholes made of universals as parts
[Lewis]
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15441
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The structural universal 'methane' needs the universal 'hydrogen' four times over
[Lewis]
|
15440
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A whole is distinct from its parts, but is not a further addition in ontology
[Lewis]
|
15443
|
Mathematicians abstract by equivalence classes, but that doesn't turn a many into one
[Lewis]
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15450
|
Maybe abstraction is just mereological subtraction
[Lewis]
|
15451
|
I assume there could be natural properties that are not instantiated in our world
[Lewis]
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15445
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Butane and Isobutane have the same atoms, but different structures
[Lewis]
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15446
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Composition is not just making new things from old; there are too many counterexamples
[Lewis]
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15444
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Different things (a toy house and toy car) can be made of the same parts at different times
[Lewis]
|
15434
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Structural universals have a necessary connection to the universals forming its parts
[Lewis]
|
15437
|
We can't get rid of structural universals if there are no simple universals
[Lewis]
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15435
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If you think universals are immanent, you must believe them to be sparse, and not every related predicate
[Lewis]
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15436
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Universals are meant to give an account of resemblance
[Lewis]
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15438
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We can add a primitive natural/unnatural distinction to class nominalism
[Lewis]
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