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Single Idea 15440

[filed under theme 9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts ]

Full Idea

A whole is an extra item in our ontology only in the minimal sense that it is not identical to any of its proper parts; but it is not distinct from them either, so when we believe in the parts it is no extra burden to believe in the whole.

Gist of Idea

A whole is distinct from its parts, but is not a further addition in ontology

Source

David Lewis (Against Structural Universals [1986], 'The pictorial')

Book Ref

Lewis,David: 'Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology' [CUP 1999], p.91

A Reaction

A little confusing, to be 'not identical' and yet 'not different'. As Lewis says elsewhere, the whole is one, and the parts are not. A crux. Essentialism implies a sort of holism, that parts with a structure constitute a new thing.

The 17 ideas from 'Against Structural Universals'

15433 Tropes are particular properties, which cannot recur, but can be exact duplicates [Lewis]
15448 The 'magical' view of structural universals says they are atoms, even though they have parts [Lewis]
15449 If 'methane' is an atomic structural universal, it has nothing to connect it to its carbon universals [Lewis]
15439 The 'pictorial' view of structural universals says they are wholes made of universals as parts [Lewis]
15441 The structural universal 'methane' needs the universal 'hydrogen' four times over [Lewis]
15440 A whole is distinct from its parts, but is not a further addition in ontology [Lewis]
15443 Mathematicians abstract by equivalence classes, but that doesn't turn a many into one [Lewis]
15450 Maybe abstraction is just mereological subtraction [Lewis]
15451 I assume there could be natural properties that are not instantiated in our world [Lewis]
15445 Butane and Isobutane have the same atoms, but different structures [Lewis]
15446 Composition is not just making new things from old; there are too many counterexamples [Lewis]
15444 Different things (a toy house and toy car) can be made of the same parts at different times [Lewis]
15434 Structural universals have a necessary connection to the universals forming its parts [Lewis]
15437 We can't get rid of structural universals if there are no simple universals [Lewis]
15435 If you think universals are immanent, you must believe them to be sparse, and not every related predicate [Lewis]
15436 Universals are meant to give an account of resemblance [Lewis]
15438 We can add a primitive natural/unnatural distinction to class nominalism [Lewis]