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Single Idea 15450
[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
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Full Idea
We could say that abstraction is just mereological subtraction of universals.
Gist of Idea
Maybe abstraction is just mereological subtraction
Source
David Lewis (Against Structural Universals [1986], 'Uninstantiated')
Book Ref
Lewis,David: 'Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology' [CUP 1999], p.103
A Reaction
This only works, of course, for the theories that complex universals have simpler universals as 'parts'. This is just a passing surmise. I take it that abstraction only works for a thing whose unity survives the abstraction.
The
17 ideas
from 'Against Structural Universals'
15433
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Tropes are particular properties, which cannot recur, but can be exact duplicates
[Lewis]
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15448
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The 'magical' view of structural universals says they are atoms, even though they have parts
[Lewis]
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15449
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If 'methane' is an atomic structural universal, it has nothing to connect it to its carbon universals
[Lewis]
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15439
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The 'pictorial' view of structural universals says they are wholes made of universals as parts
[Lewis]
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15441
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The structural universal 'methane' needs the universal 'hydrogen' four times over
[Lewis]
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15440
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A whole is distinct from its parts, but is not a further addition in ontology
[Lewis]
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15443
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Mathematicians abstract by equivalence classes, but that doesn't turn a many into one
[Lewis]
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15450
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Maybe abstraction is just mereological subtraction
[Lewis]
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15451
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I assume there could be natural properties that are not instantiated in our world
[Lewis]
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15445
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Butane and Isobutane have the same atoms, but different structures
[Lewis]
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15446
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Composition is not just making new things from old; there are too many counterexamples
[Lewis]
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15444
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Different things (a toy house and toy car) can be made of the same parts at different times
[Lewis]
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15434
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Structural universals have a necessary connection to the universals forming its parts
[Lewis]
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15437
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We can't get rid of structural universals if there are no simple universals
[Lewis]
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15435
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If you think universals are immanent, you must believe them to be sparse, and not every related predicate
[Lewis]
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15436
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Universals are meant to give an account of resemblance
[Lewis]
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15438
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We can add a primitive natural/unnatural distinction to class nominalism
[Lewis]
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