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Single Idea 15452

[filed under theme 9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object ]

Full Idea

We could not, without structures, uphold the principle that every truth has a truthmaker. If Fa is true, the truthmaker is not F, not a, nor both together; not their mereological sum; not a set-theoretic construction. These would exist just the same.

Gist of Idea

We could not uphold a truthmaker for 'Fa' without structures

Source

David Lewis (Comment on Armstrong and Forrest [1986], p.109)

Book Ref

Lewis,David: 'Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology' [CUP 1999], p.109

A Reaction

This point ought to trouble Lewis, as well as Armstrong and Forrest. If we assert 'Fa', we must (in any theory) have some idea of what unites them, as well as of their separate existence. It must a fact about 'a', not a fact about 'F'.

The 15 ideas with the same theme [general ideas about how objects must be structured]:

15465 Structures don't explain dispositions, because they consist of dispositions [Martin,CB]
15476 Structural properties involve dispositionality, so cannot be used to explain it [Martin,CB]
12685 Categorical properties depend only on the structures they represent [Ellis]
15800 All events and objects are dispositional, and hence all structural properties are dispositional [Fetzer]
15452 We could not uphold a truthmaker for 'Fa' without structures [Lewis]
15448 The 'magical' view of structural universals says they are atoms, even though they have parts [Lewis]
15449 If 'methane' is an atomic structural universal, it has nothing to connect it to its carbon universals [Lewis]
15439 The 'pictorial' view of structural universals says they are wholes made of universals as parts [Lewis]
15441 The structural universal 'methane' needs the universal 'hydrogen' four times over [Lewis]
15445 Butane and Isobutane have the same atoms, but different structures [Lewis]
15434 Structural universals have a necessary connection to the universals forming its parts [Lewis]
15437 We can't get rid of structural universals if there are no simple universals [Lewis]
11917 Structural properties are derivate properties [Molnar]
11955 There are no 'structural properties', as properties with parts [Molnar]
14535 Pandispositionalists say structures are clusters of causal powers [Mumford/Anjum]