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Single Idea 15463

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived ]

Full Idea

Prior, Pargetter and Jackson have argued convincingly for the thesis that all dispositions must have causal bases.

Gist of Idea

All dispositions must have causal bases

Source

David Lewis (Finkish dispositions [1997], II)

Book Ref

Lewis,David: 'Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology' [CUP 1999], p.140


A Reaction

[Their paper is 1982] This key thesis is tackled by modern defenders of powers. The question is not who has the best arguments, but who offers the most coherent picture. What is a 'causal basis'? What sort of thing could be primitive or fundamental?


The 23 ideas with the same theme [powers as products of something more basic]:

A power is not a cause, but an aptitude for a cause [Zabarella]
All powers can be explained by obvious features like size, shape and motion of matter [Descartes]
The complete power of an event is just the aggregate of the qualities that produced it [Hobbes]
The essence of whiteness in a man is nothing but the power to produce the idea of whiteness [Locke]
It is obvious that there could not be a power without a subject which possesses it [Reid]
Dispositions are physical states of mechanism; when known, these replace the old disposition term [Quine]
Basic powers may not be explained by structure, if at the bottom level there is no structure [Ellis]
Maybe dispositions can be explained by intrinsic properties or structures [Ellis]
I now deny that properties are cluster of powers, and take causal properties as basic [Shoemaker]
Things have powers in virtue of (which are entailed by) their properties [Shoemaker]
One power can come from different properties; a thing's powers come from its properties [Shoemaker]
Properties are functions producing powers, and powers are functions producing effects [Shoemaker]
Powers are not qualities; they just point to directions of empirical investigation [Harré/Madden]
A disposition needs a causal basis, a property in a certain causal role. Could the disposition be the property? [Lewis]
All dispositions must have causal bases [Lewis]
Lewisian properties have powers because of their relationships to other properties [Lewis, by Hawthorne]
Powers or dispositions are usually seen as caused by lower-level qualities [Heil]
Dispositions are classifications of properties by functional role [Mumford]
If dispositions have several categorical realisations, that makes the two separate [Mumford]
I say the categorical base causes the disposition manifestation [Mumford]
If all properties are potencies, and stimuli and manifestation characterise them, there is a regress [Bird]
The essence of a potency involves relations, e.g. mass, to impressed force and acceleration [Bird]
Powers are not just basic forces, since they combine to make new powers [Mumford/Anjum]