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Single Idea 15478

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets ]

Full Idea

If objects belong to classes in virtue of resemblances they bear to one another, they resemble one another in virtue of their properties. Objects resemble in some way or respect, and you could think of these ways or respects as 'properties'.

Gist of Idea

Properties are the respects in which objects resemble, which places them in classes

Source

C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 04.6)

Book Ref

Martin,C.B.: 'The Mind in Nature' [OUP 2008], p.42


A Reaction

If you pare the universe down to one object with five distinct properties, they resemble nothing, and fail this definition. Resemblance seems like the epistemology, not the ontology.


The 22 ideas with the same theme [properties are just classes of certain objects]:

When we attribute a common quality to a group, we can forget the quality and just talk of the group [Russell]
Russell refuted Frege's principle that there is a set for each property [Russell, by Sorensen]
Properties are the respects in which objects resemble, which places them in classes [Martin,CB]
Properties and relations are discovered, so they can't be mere sets of individuals [Ellis]
Treating predicates as sets drops the predicate for a new predicate 'is a member of', which is no help [Davidson]
While no two classes coincide in membership, there are distinct but coextensive attributes [Cartwright,R]
The property of being F is identical with the set of objects, in all possible worlds, which are F [Lewis, by Cameron]
Properties don't seem to be sets, because different properties can have the same set [Lewis]
Accidentally coextensive properties come apart when we include their possible instances [Lewis]
If a property is relative, such as being a father or son, then set membership seems relative too [Lewis]
Trilateral and triangular seem to be coextensive sets in all possible worlds [Lewis]
It would be easiest to take a property as the set of its instances [Lewis]
A property is the set of its actual and possible instances [Lewis, by Oliver]
I believe in properties, which are sets of possible individuals [Lewis]
A property is any class of possibilia [Lewis]
Properties are sets of their possible instances (which separates 'renate' from 'cordate') [Lewis, by Mellor/Oliver]
Properties are classes of possible and actual concrete particulars [Lewis, by Koslicki]
If classes can't be eliminated, and they are property combinations, then properties (universals) can't be either [Jacquette]
Properties have causal roles which sets can't possibly have [Heil]
Logicians use 'property' and 'set' interchangeably, with little hanging on it [Shapiro]
Construct properties as sets of objects, or say an object must be in the set to have the property [Linsky,B]
The best-known candidate for an identity condition for properties is necessary coextensiveness [Swoyer]