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Single Idea 15479

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties ]

Full Idea

Each property endows a ball with a distinctive qualitative character and a distinctive range of powers or dispositionalities.

Gist of Idea

Properties endow a ball with qualities, and with powers or dispositions

Source

C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 04.6)

Book Ref

Martin,C.B.: 'The Mind in Nature' [OUP 2008], p.42


A Reaction

I think this is the wrong way round. Do properties support powers, or powers support properties? I favour the latter. Properties are much vaguer than powers. Powers generate the required causation and activity.


The 28 ideas from C.B. Martin

Structures don't explain dispositions, because they consist of dispositions [Martin,CB]
'The wire is live' can't be analysed as a conditional, because a wire can change its powers [Martin,CB]
Powers depend on circumstances, so can't be given a conditional analysis [Martin,CB]
Causal counterfactuals are just clumsy linguistic attempts to indicate dispositions [Martin,CB]
Dispositions in action can be destroyed, be recovered, or remain unchanged [Martin,CB]
Causal laws are summaries of powers [Martin,CB]
Truth is a relation between a representation ('bearer') and part of the world ('truthmaker') [Martin,CB]
It is pointless to say possible worlds are truthmakers, and then deny that possible worlds exist [Martin,CB]
Properly understood, wholes do no more causal work than their parts [Martin,CB]
Structural properties involve dispositionality, so cannot be used to explain it [Martin,CB]
The concept of 'identity' must allow for some changes in properties or parts [Martin,CB]
We can't think of space-time as empty and propertyless, and it seems to be a substratum [Martin,CB]
I favour the idea of a substratum for properties; spacetime seems to be just a bearer of properties [Martin,CB]
A property is a combination of a disposition and a quality [Martin,CB]
Properties are the respects in which objects resemble, which places them in classes [Martin,CB]
Properties are ways particular things are, and so they are tied to the identity of their possessor [Martin,CB]
Objects are not bundles of tropes (which are ways things are, not parts of things) [Martin,CB]
Ontology is highly abstract physics, containing placeholders and exclusions [Martin,CB]
Properties endow a ball with qualities, and with powers or dispositions [Martin,CB]
Instead of a cause followed by an effect, we have dispositions in reciprocal manifestation [Martin,CB]
Only abstract things can have specific and full identity specifications [Martin,CB]
If unmanifested partnerless dispositions are still real, and are not just qualities, they can explain properties [Martin,CB]
Qualities and dispositions are aspects of properties - what it exhibits, and what it does [Martin,CB]
A property that cannot interact is worse than inert - it isn't there at all [Martin,CB]
Causation should be explained in terms of dispositions and manifestations [Martin,CB]
Explanations are mind-dependent, theory-laden, and interest-relative [Martin,CB]
Memory requires abstraction, as reminders of what cannot be fully remembered [Martin,CB]
Analogy works, as when we eat food which others seem to be relishing [Martin,CB]