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Single Idea 15482

[filed under theme 27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 6. Space-Time ]

Full Idea

It makes no sense in ontology or modern physics to think of space-time as empty and propertyless. Space-time nicely fulfils the condition of a substratum.

Clarification

A 'substratum' is a propertyless bearer of properties

Gist of Idea

We can't think of space-time as empty and propertyless, and it seems to be a substratum

Source

C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 04.6)

Book Ref

Martin,C.B.: 'The Mind in Nature' [OUP 2008], p.44


A Reaction

At the very least, space-time seems to be 'curved', so it had better be something. Time has properties like being transitive. Space-time (or fields) might be a pure bundle of properties (the only pure bundle?), rather than a substratum.

Related Idea

Idea 15481 I favour the idea of a substratum for properties; spacetime seems to be just a bearer of properties [Martin,CB]


The 28 ideas from 'The Mind in Nature'

Structures don't explain dispositions, because they consist of dispositions [Martin,CB]
'The wire is live' can't be analysed as a conditional, because a wire can change its powers [Martin,CB]
Powers depend on circumstances, so can't be given a conditional analysis [Martin,CB]
Causal counterfactuals are just clumsy linguistic attempts to indicate dispositions [Martin,CB]
Dispositions in action can be destroyed, be recovered, or remain unchanged [Martin,CB]
Causal laws are summaries of powers [Martin,CB]
Truth is a relation between a representation ('bearer') and part of the world ('truthmaker') [Martin,CB]
It is pointless to say possible worlds are truthmakers, and then deny that possible worlds exist [Martin,CB]
Properly understood, wholes do no more causal work than their parts [Martin,CB]
Structural properties involve dispositionality, so cannot be used to explain it [Martin,CB]
The concept of 'identity' must allow for some changes in properties or parts [Martin,CB]
We can't think of space-time as empty and propertyless, and it seems to be a substratum [Martin,CB]
I favour the idea of a substratum for properties; spacetime seems to be just a bearer of properties [Martin,CB]
A property is a combination of a disposition and a quality [Martin,CB]
Properties are the respects in which objects resemble, which places them in classes [Martin,CB]
Properties are ways particular things are, and so they are tied to the identity of their possessor [Martin,CB]
Objects are not bundles of tropes (which are ways things are, not parts of things) [Martin,CB]
Ontology is highly abstract physics, containing placeholders and exclusions [Martin,CB]
Properties endow a ball with qualities, and with powers or dispositions [Martin,CB]
Instead of a cause followed by an effect, we have dispositions in reciprocal manifestation [Martin,CB]
Only abstract things can have specific and full identity specifications [Martin,CB]
If unmanifested partnerless dispositions are still real, and are not just qualities, they can explain properties [Martin,CB]
Qualities and dispositions are aspects of properties - what it exhibits, and what it does [Martin,CB]
A property that cannot interact is worse than inert - it isn't there at all [Martin,CB]
Causation should be explained in terms of dispositions and manifestations [Martin,CB]
Explanations are mind-dependent, theory-laden, and interest-relative [Martin,CB]
Memory requires abstraction, as reminders of what cannot be fully remembered [Martin,CB]
Analogy works, as when we eat food which others seem to be relishing [Martin,CB]