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Single Idea 15485
[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
]
Full Idea
The two-event cause-and-effect view is easily avoided and replaced by the view of mutual manifestations of reciprocal disposition partners, suggesting a natural contemporaneity.
Gist of Idea
Instead of a cause followed by an effect, we have dispositions in reciprocal manifestation
Source
C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 05.1)
Book Ref
Martin,C.B.: 'The Mind in Nature' [OUP 2008], p.46
A Reaction
This view, which I find much more congenial than the traditional one, is explored in the ideas of Mumford and Anjum.
The
28 ideas
from C.B. Martin
15465
|
Structures don't explain dispositions, because they consist of dispositions
[Martin,CB]
|
15466
|
'The wire is live' can't be analysed as a conditional, because a wire can change its powers
[Martin,CB]
|
15467
|
Powers depend on circumstances, so can't be given a conditional analysis
[Martin,CB]
|
15468
|
Causal counterfactuals are just clumsy linguistic attempts to indicate dispositions
[Martin,CB]
|
15469
|
Dispositions in action can be destroyed, be recovered, or remain unchanged
[Martin,CB]
|
15470
|
Causal laws are summaries of powers
[Martin,CB]
|
15471
|
Truth is a relation between a representation ('bearer') and part of the world ('truthmaker')
[Martin,CB]
|
15472
|
It is pointless to say possible worlds are truthmakers, and then deny that possible worlds exist
[Martin,CB]
|
15474
|
Properly understood, wholes do no more causal work than their parts
[Martin,CB]
|
15475
|
The concept of 'identity' must allow for some changes in properties or parts
[Martin,CB]
|
15476
|
Structural properties involve dispositionality, so cannot be used to explain it
[Martin,CB]
|
15481
|
I favour the idea of a substratum for properties; spacetime seems to be just a bearer of properties
[Martin,CB]
|
15484
|
A property is a combination of a disposition and a quality
[Martin,CB]
|
15478
|
Properties are the respects in which objects resemble, which places them in classes
[Martin,CB]
|
15483
|
Properties are ways particular things are, and so they are tied to the identity of their possessor
[Martin,CB]
|
15480
|
Objects are not bundles of tropes (which are ways things are, not parts of things)
[Martin,CB]
|
15477
|
Ontology is highly abstract physics, containing placeholders and exclusions
[Martin,CB]
|
15479
|
Properties endow a ball with qualities, and with powers or dispositions
[Martin,CB]
|
15482
|
We can't think of space-time as empty and propertyless, and it seems to be a substratum
[Martin,CB]
|
15485
|
Instead of a cause followed by an effect, we have dispositions in reciprocal manifestation
[Martin,CB]
|
15486
|
Only abstract things can have specific and full identity specifications
[Martin,CB]
|
15487
|
If unmanifested partnerless dispositions are still real, and are not just qualities, they can explain properties
[Martin,CB]
|
15488
|
Qualities and dispositions are aspects of properties - what it exhibits, and what it does
[Martin,CB]
|
15489
|
A property that cannot interact is worse than inert - it isn't there at all
[Martin,CB]
|
15491
|
Causation should be explained in terms of dispositions and manifestations
[Martin,CB]
|
15492
|
Explanations are mind-dependent, theory-laden, and interest-relative
[Martin,CB]
|
15493
|
Memory requires abstraction, as reminders of what cannot be fully remembered
[Martin,CB]
|
15495
|
Analogy works, as when we eat food which others seem to be relishing
[Martin,CB]
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