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Single Idea 15489

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers ]

Full Idea

A property that is intrinsically incapable of affecting or being affected by anything else, actual or possible, is not merely a case of inertness - it amounts to a no-thing.

Gist of Idea

A property that cannot interact is worse than inert - it isn't there at all

Source

C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 06.6)

Book Ref

Martin,C.B.: 'The Mind in Nature' [OUP 2008], p.66

A Reaction

In the end Martin rejects Shoemaker's purely causal account of properties, but he clearly understands Shoemaker's point well.

Related Idea

Idea 3534 To be is to have causal powers [Alexander,S]

The 28 ideas from C.B. Martin

15465 Structures don't explain dispositions, because they consist of dispositions [Martin,CB]
15466 'The wire is live' can't be analysed as a conditional, because a wire can change its powers [Martin,CB]
15467 Powers depend on circumstances, so can't be given a conditional analysis [Martin,CB]
15468 Causal counterfactuals are just clumsy linguistic attempts to indicate dispositions [Martin,CB]
15469 Dispositions in action can be destroyed, be recovered, or remain unchanged [Martin,CB]
15470 Causal laws are summaries of powers [Martin,CB]
15471 Truth is a relation between a representation ('bearer') and part of the world ('truthmaker') [Martin,CB]
15472 It is pointless to say possible worlds are truthmakers, and then deny that possible worlds exist [Martin,CB]
15474 Properly understood, wholes do no more causal work than their parts [Martin,CB]
15476 Structural properties involve dispositionality, so cannot be used to explain it [Martin,CB]
15475 The concept of 'identity' must allow for some changes in properties or parts [Martin,CB]
15482 We can't think of space-time as empty and propertyless, and it seems to be a substratum [Martin,CB]
15481 I favour the idea of a substratum for properties; spacetime seems to be just a bearer of properties [Martin,CB]
15484 A property is a combination of a disposition and a quality [Martin,CB]
15478 Properties are the respects in which objects resemble, which places them in classes [Martin,CB]
15483 Properties are ways particular things are, and so they are tied to the identity of their possessor [Martin,CB]
15480 Objects are not bundles of tropes (which are ways things are, not parts of things) [Martin,CB]
15477 Ontology is highly abstract physics, containing placeholders and exclusions [Martin,CB]
15479 Properties endow a ball with qualities, and with powers or dispositions [Martin,CB]
15485 Instead of a cause followed by an effect, we have dispositions in reciprocal manifestation [Martin,CB]
15486 Only abstract things can have specific and full identity specifications [Martin,CB]
15487 If unmanifested partnerless dispositions are still real, and are not just qualities, they can explain properties [Martin,CB]
15488 Qualities and dispositions are aspects of properties - what it exhibits, and what it does [Martin,CB]
15489 A property that cannot interact is worse than inert - it isn't there at all [Martin,CB]
15491 Causation should be explained in terms of dispositions and manifestations [Martin,CB]
15492 Explanations are mind-dependent, theory-laden, and interest-relative [Martin,CB]
15493 Memory requires abstraction, as reminders of what cannot be fully remembered [Martin,CB]
15495 Analogy works, as when we eat food which others seem to be relishing [Martin,CB]