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Single Idea 15501

[filed under theme 7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff ]

Full Idea

As yet we have no idea of any third sort of thing that is neither individual nor class nor mixture of the two.

Gist of Idea

We have no idea of a third sort of thing, that isn't an individual, a class, or their mixture

Source

David Lewis (Parts of Classes [1991], 1.2)

Book Ref

Lewis,David: 'Parts of Classes' [Blackwell 1991], p.8

A Reaction

You can see that Lewis was a pupil of Quine. I quote this to show how little impression 'stuff' makes on the modern radar. His defence is that stuff may not be a 'thing', but then he seems to think that 'things' exhaust reality (top p.8 and 9).

The 17 ideas with the same theme [general masses which are fairly homogeneous]:

16771 A composite is a true unity if all of its parts fall under one essence [Scheibler]
6472 Continuity is a sufficient criterion for the identity of a rock, but not for part of a smooth fluid [Russell]
16939 Mass terms just concern spread, but other terms involve both spread and individuation [Quine]
15319 Hard individual blocks don't fix what 'things' are; fluids are no less material things [Harré/Madden]
15501 We have no idea of a third sort of thing, that isn't an individual, a class, or their mixture [Lewis]
15504 Atomless gunk is an individual whose parts all have further proper parts [Lewis]
17578 I reject talk of 'stuff', and treat it in terms of particles [Inwagen]
12793 Early pre-Socratics had a mass-noun ontology, which was replaced by count-nouns [Benardete,JA]
13386 If objects are just conventional, there is no ontological distinction between stuff and things [Jubien]
13488 Mass words do not have plurals, or numerical adjectives, or use 'fewer' [Hart,WD]
15014 Unlike things, stuff obeys unrestricted composition and mereological essentialism [Sider]
12847 Mass nouns admit 'much' and 'a little', and resist 'many' and 'few'. [Simons]
12863 Mass terms (unlike plurals) are used with indifference to whether they can exist in units [Simons]
12862 Gold is not its atoms, because the atoms must be all gold, but gold contains neutrons [Simons]
12792 The category of stuff does not suit reference [Laycock]
12799 Descriptions of stuff are neither singular aggregates nor plural collections [Laycock]
17436 We talk of snow as what stays the same, when it is a heap or drift or expanse [Koslicki]