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Single Idea 15504

[filed under theme 7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff ]

Full Idea

A blob can represent atomless gunk: an individual whose parts all have further proper parts.

Gist of Idea

Atomless gunk is an individual whose parts all have further proper parts

Source

David Lewis (Parts of Classes [1991], 1.8)

Book Ref

Lewis,David: 'Parts of Classes' [Blackwell 1991], p.20


A Reaction

This is not the same as 'stuff', since gunk is a precise fusion of all those parts, whereas there is no such precision about stuff. Stuff is neutral as to whether it has atoms, or is endlessly divisible. My love of stuff grows. Laycock is a hero.

Related Idea

Idea 18516 A 'gunky' universe would literally have no parts at all [Heil]


The 17 ideas with the same theme [general masses which are fairly homogeneous]:

A composite is a true unity if all of its parts fall under one essence [Scheibler]
Continuity is a sufficient criterion for the identity of a rock, but not for part of a smooth fluid [Russell]
Mass terms just concern spread, but other terms involve both spread and individuation [Quine]
Hard individual blocks don't fix what 'things' are; fluids are no less material things [Harré/Madden]
We have no idea of a third sort of thing, that isn't an individual, a class, or their mixture [Lewis]
Atomless gunk is an individual whose parts all have further proper parts [Lewis]
I reject talk of 'stuff', and treat it in terms of particles [Inwagen]
Early pre-Socratics had a mass-noun ontology, which was replaced by count-nouns [Benardete,JA]
If objects are just conventional, there is no ontological distinction between stuff and things [Jubien]
Mass words do not have plurals, or numerical adjectives, or use 'fewer' [Hart,WD]
Unlike things, stuff obeys unrestricted composition and mereological essentialism [Sider]
Mass nouns admit 'much' and 'a little', and resist 'many' and 'few'. [Simons]
Mass terms (unlike plurals) are used with indifference to whether they can exist in units [Simons]
Gold is not its atoms, because the atoms must be all gold, but gold contains neutrons [Simons]
The category of stuff does not suit reference [Laycock]
Descriptions of stuff are neither singular aggregates nor plural collections [Laycock]
We talk of snow as what stays the same, when it is a heap or drift or expanse [Koslicki]