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Single Idea 15530
[filed under theme 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
]
Full Idea
A logically determinate name is one which names the same thing in every possible world.
Gist of Idea
A logically determinate name names the same thing in every possible world
Source
David Lewis (How to Define Theoretical Terms [1970], III)
Book Ref
Lewis,David: 'Philosophical Papers Vol.1' [OUP 1983], p.86
A Reaction
This appears to be rigid designation, before Kripke introduced the new word.
The
22 ideas
with the same theme
[items with fixed identity in all possible worlds]:
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13588
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A rigid designator (for all possible worlds) picks out an object by its essential traits
[Quine]
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11187
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In possible worlds, names are just neutral unvarying pegs for truths and predicates
[Marcus (Barcan)]
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9172
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A 'rigid designator' designates the same object in all possible worlds
[Kripke]
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9173
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We cannot say that Nixon might have been a different man from the one he actually was
[Kripke]
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7761
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Test for rigidity by inserting into the sentence 'N might not have been N'
[Kripke, by Lycan]
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7693
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Kripke avoids difficulties of transworld identity by saying it is a decision, not a discovery
[Kripke, by Jacquette]
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5821
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Saying that natural kinds are 'rigid designators' is the same as saying they are 'indexical'
[Kripke, by Putnam]
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14068
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If Kripke names must still denote a thing in a non-actual situation, the statue isn't its clay
[Gibbard on Kripke]
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10436
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A rigid expression may refer at a world to an object not existing in that world
[Kripke, by Sainsbury]
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4953
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We do not begin with possible worlds and place objects in them; we begin with objects in the real world
[Kripke]
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4961
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It is a necessary truth that Elizabeth II was the child of two particular parents
[Kripke]
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17003
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Kaplan's 'Dthat' is a useful operator for transforming a description into a rigid designation
[Kripke]
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11891
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Possibilities for an individual can only refer to that individual, in some possible world
[Plantinga, by Mackie,P]
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11881
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Rigid designators can be meaningful even if empty
[Evans, by Mackie,P]
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12138
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Identity across possible worlds is prior to rigid designation
[Brody]
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16408
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Rigid designation seems to presuppose that differing worlds contain the same individuals
[Stalnaker]
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14079
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Kripke's semantics needs lots of intuitions about which properties are essential
[Gibbard]
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11979
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It doesn't take the whole of a possible Humphrey to win the election
[Lewis]
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15530
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A logically determinate name names the same thing in every possible world
[Lewis]
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12237
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Rigid designation has at least three essentialist presuppositions
[Oderberg]
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15174
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A thing doesn't need transworld identity prior to rigid reference - that could be a convention of the reference
[Sidelle]
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15183
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'Dthat' operates to make a singular term into a rigid term
[Sidelle]
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