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Single Idea 15543

[filed under theme 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. States of Affairs ]

Full Idea

To me it is mysterious how a state of affairs is made out of its particular and universal constituents. Different states of affairs may have the very same constituents, and the existence of constituents by no means entails the existence of the states.

Gist of Idea

How do things combine to make states of affairs? Constituents can repeat, and fail to combine

Source

David Lewis (Armstrong on combinatorial possibility [1992], 'What is there')

Book Ref

Lewis,David: 'Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology' [CUP 1999], p.200


A Reaction

He is rejecting the structure of states of affairs as wholes made of parts. But then mereology was never going to explain the structure of the world.


The 8 ideas with the same theme [reality as a collection of complex situations]:

Modern trope theory tries, like logical atomism, to reduce things to elementary states [Russell, by Ellis]
A state of affairs pertains to a thing if it implies that it has some property [Chisholm]
I propose that events and propositions are two types of states of affairs [Chisholm]
The mark of a state of affairs is that it is capable of being accepted [Chisholm]
Truthmaking needs states of affairs, to unite particulars with tropes or universals. [Armstrong]
Events are changes in states of affairs (which consist of structured particulars, with powers and relations) [Harré/Madden]
How do things combine to make states of affairs? Constituents can repeat, and fail to combine [Lewis]
We must distinguish 'concrete' from 'abstract' and necessary states of affairs. [Sider]