more on this theme     |     more from this thinker


Single Idea 15545

[filed under theme 1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis ]

Full Idea

I suggest that Armstrong has an unfamiliar notion of analysis, as not primarily a quest for definitions, but as a quest for truth-makers.

Gist of Idea

Armstrong's analysis seeks truthmakers rather than definitions

Source

David Lewis (Armstrong on combinatorial possibility [1992], 'The demand')

Book Ref

Lewis,David: 'Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology' [CUP 1999], p.203


A Reaction

This is not a dichotomy, I think, but a shift of emphasis. A definition will probably refer to truthmakers; a decent account of truthmakers would approximate a definition.


The 5 ideas from 'Armstrong on combinatorial possibility'

Presentism says only the present exists, so there is nothing for tensed truths to supervene on [Lewis]
Armstrong's analysis seeks truthmakers rather than definitions [Lewis]
Predications aren't true because of what exists, but of how it exists [Lewis]
Say 'truth is supervenient on being', but construe 'being' broadly [Lewis]
How do things combine to make states of affairs? Constituents can repeat, and fail to combine [Lewis]