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Single Idea 15548

[filed under theme 3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths ]

Full Idea

I want to say that 'truth is supervenient on being', but as an Ostrich about universals I want to construe 'being' broadly.

Clarification

An 'Ostrich' refuses to admit the problem of universals

Gist of Idea

Say 'truth is supervenient on being', but construe 'being' broadly

Source

David Lewis (Armstrong on combinatorial possibility [1992], 'Truth')

Book Ref

Lewis,David: 'Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology' [CUP 1999], p.206

A Reaction

[His slogan is borrowed from Bigelow 1988:132-,158-9] This seems much more promising that the more precise and restricted notion of truthmakers, as resting on the existence of particular things. Presentism is the big test case.

The 7 ideas with the same theme [truths supervene on how things actually are]:

6994 Truth supervenes on being [Jackson]
15548 Say 'truth is supervenient on being', but construe 'being' broadly [Lewis]
14025 The weaker version of Truthmaker: 'truth supervenes on being' [Crisp,TM]
14396 If 'truth supervenes on being', worlds with the same entities, properties and relations have the same truths [Merricks]
14400 If truth supervenes on being, that won't explain why truth depends on being [Merricks]
18346 'Truth supervenes on being' only gives necessary (not sufficient) conditions for contingent truths [Rami]
18345 'Truth supervenes on being' avoids entities as truth-makers for negative truths [Rami]