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Full Idea
I want to say that 'truth is supervenient on being', but as an Ostrich about universals I want to construe 'being' broadly.
Clarification
An 'Ostrich' refuses to admit the problem of universals
Gist of Idea
Say 'truth is supervenient on being', but construe 'being' broadly
Source
David Lewis (Armstrong on combinatorial possibility [1992], 'Truth')
Book Ref
Lewis,David: 'Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology' [CUP 1999], p.206
A Reaction
[His slogan is borrowed from Bigelow 1988:132-,158-9] This seems much more promising that the more precise and restricted notion of truthmakers, as resting on the existence of particular things. Presentism is the big test case.
| 14399 | Presentism says only the present exists, so there is nothing for tensed truths to supervene on [Lewis] |
| 15545 | Armstrong's analysis seeks truthmakers rather than definitions [Lewis] |
| 15546 | Predications aren't true because of what exists, but of how it exists [Lewis] |
| 15548 | Say 'truth is supervenient on being', but construe 'being' broadly [Lewis] |
| 15543 | How do things combine to make states of affairs? Constituents can repeat, and fail to combine [Lewis] |