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Single Idea 15551

[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause ]

Full Idea

There is no one right way - though there may be more or less natural ways - of carving up a causal history.

Gist of Idea

Ways of carving causes may be natural, but never 'right'

Source

David Lewis (Causal Explanation [1986], I)

Book Ref

Lewis,David: 'Philosophical Papers Vol.2' [OUP 1986], p.215


A Reaction

This invites a distinction between the 'natural' causes and the 'real' causes. Presumably if any causes were 'real', they would have a better claim to be 'right'. Is an earthquake the 'real' (correct?) cause of a tsunami?


The 14 ideas with the same theme [naming 'the' cause among the pre-condtions of events]:

Causes and conditions are not distinct, because we select capriciously from among them [Mill]
The strict cause is the total positive and negative conditions which ensure the consequent [Mill]
Understanding by means of causes is useless if they are not reduced to a minimum number [James]
A cause is a change which occurs close to the effect and just before it [Ducasse]
An alien might think oxygen was the main cause of a forest fire [Putnam]
A cause is an Insufficient but Necessary part of an Unnecessary but Sufficient condition [Mackie]
The cause (or part of it) is what stimulates or releases the powerful particular thing involved [Harré/Madden]
Ways of carving causes may be natural, but never 'right' [Lewis]
We only pick 'the' cause for the purposes of some particular enquiry. [Lewis]
It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause [Lewis]
The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions [Lewis]
Our selection of 'the' cause is very predictable, so must have a basis [Schaffer,J]
Selecting 'the' cause must have a basis; there is no causation without such a selection [Schaffer,J]
Privileging one cause is just an epistemic or pragmatic matter, not an ontological one [Mumford/Anjum]