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Single Idea 15555

[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause ]

Full Idea

Explaining why struck matches light in general is not so very different from explaining why some particular struck match lit. ...We may generalize modestly, without laying claim to universality.

Gist of Idea

Explaining match lighting in general is like explaining one lighting of a match

Source

David Lewis (Causal Explanation [1986], IV)

Book Ref

Lewis,David: 'Philosophical Papers Vol.2' [OUP 1986], p.225


A Reaction

A suggestive remark, since particular causation and general causation seem far apart, but Lewis suggests that the needs of explanation bring them together. Lawlike and unlawlike explanations?


The 21 ideas with the same theme [categories of links between successive events]:

Fancy being unable to distinguish a cause from its necessary background conditions! [Plato]
Types of cause are nature, necessity and chance, and mind and human agency [Aristotle]
The 'form' of a thing explains why the matter constitutes that particular thing [Aristotle, by Politis]
A 'material' cause/explanation is the form of whatever is the source [Aristotle, by Politis]
Causes produce a few things in their own right, and innumerable things coincidentally [Aristotle]
In the schools the Four Causes are just lumped together in a very obscure way [Leibniz]
Causation is defined in terms of a single sequence, and constant conjunction is no part of it [Ducasse]
Some propose a distinct 'agent causation', as well as 'event causation' [Chisholm]
Absences might be effects, but surely not causes? [Armstrong]
Causes are between events ('the explosion') or between facts/states of affairs ('a bomb dropped') [Bennett]
If the concept of a cause includes its usual effects, we call it a 'power' [Harré/Madden]
Explaining match lighting in general is like explaining one lighting of a match [Lewis]
Causation is either direct realism, Humean reduction, non-Humean reduction or theoretical realism [Tooley]
Causation distinctions: reductionism/realism; Humean/non-Humean states; observable/non-observable [Tooley]
Singular causation is prior to general causation; each aspirin produces the aspirin generalization [Molnar]
Causation can be seen in counterfactual terms, or as increased probability, or as energy flow [Crane]
Three divisions of causal theories: generalist/singularist, intrinsic/extrinsic, reductive/non-reductive [Psillos]
The dispositional account explains causation, as stimulation and manifestation of dispositions [Bird]
Scholastic causation is by changes in the primary qualities of hot, cold, wet, dry [Pasnau]
Humeans describe the surface of causation, while powers accounts aim at deeper explanations [Ingthorsson]
Time and space are not causal, but they determine natural phenomena [Ingthorsson]