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Full Idea
I think we are right to explain chance events, yet we are right also to deny that we can ever explain why a chance process yields one outcome rather than another. We cannot explain why one event happened rather than the other.
Gist of Idea
We can explain a chance event, but can never show why some other outcome did not occur
Source
David Lewis (Causal Explanation [1986], VI)
Book Ref
Lewis,David: 'Philosophical Papers Vol.2' [OUP 1986], p.230
A Reaction
This misses out an investigation which slowly reveals that a 'chance' event wasn't so chancey after all. Failure to explain confirms chance, so the judgement of chance shouldn't block attempts to explain.
| 4809 | Lewis endorses the thesis that all explanation of singular events is causal explanation [Lewis, by Psillos] |
| 15551 | Ways of carving causes may be natural, but never 'right' [Lewis] |
| 15552 | We only pick 'the' cause for the purposes of some particular enquiry. [Lewis] |
| 15553 | Causal dependence is counterfactual dependence between events [Lewis] |
| 14321 | To explain an event is to provide some information about its causal history [Lewis] |
| 15554 | A disposition needs a causal basis, a property in a certain causal role. Could the disposition be the property? [Lewis] |
| 15555 | Explaining match lighting in general is like explaining one lighting of a match [Lewis] |
| 15556 | Science may well pursue generalised explanation, rather than laws [Lewis] |
| 15558 | A good explanation is supposed to show that the event had to happen [Lewis] |
| 15559 | Does a good explanation produce understanding? That claim is just empty [Lewis] |
| 15557 | Verisimilitude has proved hard to analyse, and seems to have several components [Lewis] |
| 15560 | We can explain a chance event, but can never show why some other outcome did not occur [Lewis] |