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Single Idea 15561

[filed under theme 7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events ]

Full Idea

There is no guarantee that events made for semantics are the same as events that are causes and effects.

Gist of Idea

The events that suit semantics may not be the events that suit causation

Source

David Lewis (Events [1986], I)

Book Ref

Lewis,David: 'Philosophical Papers Vol.2' [OUP 1986], p.241

A Reaction

This little cri de couer could be a motto for a huge amount of analytic philosophy, which (for some odd reason) thought that mathematics, logic, set theory and formal semantics were good tools for explaining nature.

The 17 ideas with the same theme [what we should take events to consist of]:

15832 Events are states of affairs that occur at certain places and times [Chisholm]
8439 Maybe each event has only one possible causal history [Bennett]
8440 Maybe an event's time of occurrence is essential to it [Bennett]
7771 We need 'events' to explain adverbs, which are adjectival predicates of events [Davidson, by Lycan]
8860 Language-learning is not good enough evidence for the existence of events [Yablo on Davidson]
17520 Events do not have natural boundaries, and we have to set them [Ayers]
15561 The events that suit semantics may not be the events that suit causation [Lewis]
15565 Events have inbuilt essences, as necessary conditions for their occurrence [Lewis]
15566 Events are classes, and so there is a mereology of their parts [Lewis]
15567 Some events involve no change; they must, because causal histories involve unchanges [Lewis]
3310 If slowness is a property of walking rather than the walker, we must allow that events exist [Benardete,JA]
8270 Events are changes or non-changes in properties and relations of persisting objects [Lowe]
4219 Numerically distinct events of the same kind (like two battles) can coincide in space and time [Lowe]
8973 Einstein's relativity brought events into ontology, as the terms of a simultaneity relationships [Simons]
6143 Prolonged events don't seem to endure or exist at any particular time [Merricks]
12840 I do not think there is a general identity condition for events [Simons]
14541 Events are essentially changes; property exemplifications are just states of affairs [Mumford/Anjum]