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Single Idea 15580

[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems ]

Full Idea

We always take a noise as the sound of something; we always take a hue as the color of something. We simply do not experience raw, uninterpreted sense-data - these are the inventions of philosophers.

Gist of Idea

There are no raw sense-data - our experiences are of the sound or colour of something

Source

Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], 207/163-4), quoted by Richard Polt - Heidegger: an introduction 3.§31-3

Book Ref

Polt,Richard: 'Heidegger: an introduction' [Routledge 2003], p.71

A Reaction

This is something like the modern view of sense-data as promoted by John McDowell, rather than the experiential atoms of Russell and Moore. Experience is holistic, but that doesn't mean we can't analyse it into components.

The 19 ideas with the same theme [difficulties with the concept of sense-data]:

6476 We cannot assume that the subject actually exists, so we cannot distinguish sensations from sense-data [Russell]
8854 My 'acquaintance' with sense-data is nothing like my knowing New York [Williams,M on Russell]
6458 Individuating sense-data is difficult, because they divide when closely attended to [Russell]
6469 Sense-data may be subjective, if closing our eyes can change them [Russell]
15580 There are no raw sense-data - our experiences are of the sound or colour of something [Heidegger]
18729 Part of what we mean by stating the facts is the way we tend to experience them [Wittgenstein]
6501 As sense-data are necessarily private, they are attacked by Wittgenstein's objections [Wittgenstein, by Robinson,H]
6493 We are not conscious of pure liquidity, but of the liquidity of water [Firth]
21686 Sense-data are dubious abstractions, with none of the plausibility of tables [Quine]
15819 Do sense-data have structure, location, weight, and constituting matter? [Chisholm]
3296 Sense-data are a false objectification of what is essentially subjective [Nagel]
15244 We experience qualities as of objects, not on their own [Harré/Madden]
7639 The Homunculus Fallacy explains a subject perceiving objects by repeating the problem internally [Evans]
3581 Sense data can't give us knowledge if they are non-propositional [Williams,M]
6505 Sense-data are rejected because they are a veil between us and reality, leading to scepticism [Robinson,H]
4101 If we smell something we are aware of the smell separately, but we don't perceive a 'look' when we see [Crane]
4102 The problems of perception disappear if it is a relation to an intentional state, not to an object or sense datum [Crane]
6639 The 'disjunctive' theory of perception says true perceptions and hallucinations need have nothing in common [Lowe]
4720 Sense-data are only safe from scepticism if they are primitive and unconceptualised [O'Grady]