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Single Idea 15587

[filed under theme 19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics ]

Full Idea

In my 'Semantic Relationism' the fact that two utterances say the same thing is not entirely a matter of their intrinsic semantic features; it may also turn on semantic relationships among the utterances of their parts not reducible to those features.

Gist of Idea

That two utterances say the same thing may not be intrinsic to them, but involve their relationships

Source

Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], Intro)

Book Ref

Fine,Kit: 'Semantic Relationism' [OUP 2007], p.3

A Reaction

You'll need to read the book slowly several times to get the hang of this, but at least it allows that two different utterances might say the same thing (express the same proposition, I would say).

Related Idea

Idea 15588 You cannot determine the full content from a thought's intrinsic character, as relations are involved [Fine,K]

The 26 ideas with the same theme [general ideas about assigning meaning to symbols]:

15788 Syntax and semantics are indeterminate, and modern 'semantics' is a bogus subject [Quine, by Lycan]
16461 We still lack an agreed semantics for quantifiers in natural language [Stalnaker]
16403 'Descriptive' semantics gives a system for a language; 'foundational' semantics give underlying facts [Stalnaker]
12616 English has no semantic theory, just associations between sentences and thoughts [Fodor]
2434 Broad semantics holds that the basic semantic properties are truth and denotation [Fodor]
12645 Semantics (esp. referential semantics) allows inferences from utterances to the world [Fodor]
12646 Semantics relates to the world, so it is never just psychological [Fodor]
7872 Teleosemantics equates meaning with the item the concept is intended to track [Papineau]
13965 Semantics as theory of meaning and semantics as truth-based logical consequence are very different [Soames]
14618 Semantics is either an assignment of semantic values, or a theory of truth [Fine,K]
14621 Semantics is a body of semantic requirements, not semantic truths or assigned values [Fine,K]
15587 That two utterances say the same thing may not be intrinsic to them, but involve their relationships [Fine,K]
15589 The two main theories are Holism (which is inferential), and Representational (which is atomistic) [Fine,K]
15596 The standard aim of semantics is to assign a semantic value to each expression [Fine,K]
15598 We should pursue semantic facts as stated by truths in theories (and not put the theories first!) [Fine,K]
15600 Referentialist semantics has objects for names, properties for predicates, and propositions for connectives [Fine,K]
15601 Fregeans approach the world through sense, Referentialists through reference [Fine,K]
19534 How does inferentialism distinguish the patterns of inference that are essential to meaning? [Williamson]
19535 Internalist inferentialism has trouble explaining how meaning and reference relate [Williamson]
19533 Inferentialist semantics relies on internal inference relations, not on external references [Williamson]
18038 The 't' and 'f' of formal semantics has no philosophical interest, and may not refer to true and false [Williamson]
18791 In 'situation semantics' our main concepts are abstracted from situations [Mares]
19538 Entailment is modelled in formal semantics as set inclusion (where 'mammals' contains 'cats') [Dougherty/Rysiew]
18053 The semantics of a sentence is its potential for changing a context [Magidor]
14720 Semantic theory assigns meanings to expressions, and metasemantics explains how this works [Schroeter]
17732 Success semantics explains representation in terms of success in action [Jenkins]