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Single Idea 15596
[filed under theme 19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
]
Full Idea
The aim of semantics, as standardly conceived, is to assign a semantic value to each (meaningful) expression of the language under consideration.
Gist of Idea
The standard aim of semantics is to assign a semantic value to each expression
Source
Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 1.G)
Book Ref
Fine,Kit: 'Semantic Relationism' [OUP 2007], p.25
A Reaction
Fine is raising the difficulty that these values can get entangled with one another. He proposes 'semantic connections' as a better aim.
The
18 ideas
from 'Semantic Relationism'
15588
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You cannot determine the full content from a thought's intrinsic character, as relations are involved
[Fine,K]
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15587
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That two utterances say the same thing may not be intrinsic to them, but involve their relationships
[Fine,K]
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15589
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The two main theories are Holism (which is inferential), and Representational (which is atomistic)
[Fine,K]
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15590
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It seemed that Frege gave the syntax for variables, and Tarski the semantics, and that was that
[Fine,K]
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15591
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In separate expressions variables seem identical in role, but in the same expression they aren't
[Fine,K]
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15592
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The usual Tarskian interpretation of variables is to specify their range of values
[Fine,K]
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15593
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Variables can be viewed as special terms - functions taking assignments into individuals
[Fine,K]
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15595
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The 'algebraic' account of variables reduces quantification to the algebra of its component parts
[Fine,K]
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15594
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'Instantial' accounts of variables say we grasp arbitrary instances from their use in quantification
[Fine,K]
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15596
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The standard aim of semantics is to assign a semantic value to each expression
[Fine,K]
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15598
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We should pursue semantic facts as stated by truths in theories (and not put the theories first!)
[Fine,K]
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15599
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Cicero/Cicero and Cicero/Tully may differ in relationship, despite being semantically the same
[Fine,K]
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15600
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Referentialist semantics has objects for names, properties for predicates, and propositions for connectives
[Fine,K]
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15601
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Fregeans approach the world through sense, Referentialists through reference
[Fine,K]
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15603
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I can only represent individuals as the same if I do not already represent them as the same
[Fine,K]
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15604
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If Cicero=Tully refers to the man twice, then surely Cicero=Cicero does as well?
[Fine,K]
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15602
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Mental files are devices for keeping track of basic coordination of objects
[Fine,K]
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15605
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I take indexicals such as 'this' and 'that' to be linked to some associated demonstration
[Fine,K]
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