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Single Idea 15597

[filed under theme 19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference ]

Full Idea

Frege's Puzzle: If two sentences convey different information, they have different semantic roles, so the names 'Cicero' and 'Tully' are semantically different, in which case they are referentially different - but they are not referentially different.

Clarification

'Cicero' and 'Tully' are two names for the same person

Gist of Idea

Frege's Puzzle: from different semantics we infer different reference for two names with the same reference

Source

report of Gottlob Frege (On Sense and Reference [1892]) by Kit Fine - Semantic Relationism 2.A

Book Ref

Fine,Kit: 'Semantic Relationism' [OUP 2007], p.34


A Reaction

[this is my summary of Fine's summary] Given the paradox, the question is which of these premisses should be challenged. Fregeans reject their being referentially different. Referentialists reject the different semantic roles.


The 17 ideas with the same theme [reference language has two components]:

Frege's Puzzle: from different semantics we infer different reference for two names with the same reference [Frege, by Fine,K]
Frege's 'sense' is ambiguous, between the meaning of a designator, and how it fixes reference [Kripke on Frege]
Every descriptive name has a sense, but may not have a reference [Frege]
Frege started as anti-realist, but the sense/reference distinction led him to realism [Frege, by Benardete,JA]
The meaning (reference) of 'evening star' is the same as that of 'morning star', but not the sense [Frege]
In maths, there are phrases with a clear sense, but no actual reference [Frege]
We are driven from sense to reference by our desire for truth [Frege]
Senses can't be subjective, because propositions would be private, and disagreement impossible [Frege]
By eliminating descriptions from primitive notation, Russell seems to reject 'sense' [Russell, by Kripke]
Often reference determines sense, and not (as Frege thought) vice versa [Putnam, by Scruton]
It is generally accepted that sense is defined as the determiner of reference [Katz]
It is claimed that reference doesn't fix sense (Jocasta), and sense doesn't fix reference (Twin Earth) [Fodor]
Referential Opacity says truth is lost when you substitute one referring term ('mother') for another ('Jocasta') [Rey]
Reference needs truth as well as sense [Hale/Wright]
Sense determines reference says same sense/same reference; new reference means new sense [Recanati]
We need sense as well as reference, but in a non-descriptive form, and mental files do that [Recanati]
Sense is a mental file (not its contents); similar files for Cicero and Tully are two senses [Recanati]