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Single Idea 15597
[filed under theme 19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
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Full Idea
Frege's Puzzle: If two sentences convey different information, they have different semantic roles, so the names 'Cicero' and 'Tully' are semantically different, in which case they are referentially different - but they are not referentially different.
Clarification
'Cicero' and 'Tully' are two names for the same person
Gist of Idea
Frege's Puzzle: from different semantics we infer different reference for two names with the same reference
Source
report of Gottlob Frege (On Sense and Reference [1892]) by Kit Fine - Semantic Relationism 2.A
Book Ref
Fine,Kit: 'Semantic Relationism' [OUP 2007], p.34
A Reaction
[this is my summary of Fine's summary] Given the paradox, the question is which of these premisses should be challenged. Fregeans reject their being referentially different. Referentialists reject the different semantic roles.
The
33 ideas
from 'On Sense and Reference'
8187
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Frege was strongly in favour of taking truth to attach to propositions
[Frege, by Dummett]
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10510
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Frege ascribes reference to incomplete expressions, as well as to singular terms
[Frege, by Hale]
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18772
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We can treat designation by a few words as a proper name
[Frege]
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14075
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Proper name in modal contexts refer obliquely, to their usual sense
[Frege, by Gibbard]
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10424
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A Fregean proper name has a sense determining an object, instead of a concept
[Frege, by Sainsbury]
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9462
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Frege is intensionalist about reference, as it is determined by sense; identity of objects comes first
[Frege, by Jacquette]
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18936
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Frege moved from extensional to intensional semantics when he added the idea of 'sense'
[Frege, by Sawyer]
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10533
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We can't get a semantics from nouns and predicates referring to the same thing
[Frege, by Dummett]
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4893
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Frege was asking how identities could be informative
[Frege, by Perry]
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18752
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'The concept "horse"' denotes a concept, yet seems also to denote an object
[Frege, by McGee]
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22318
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Frege failed to show when two sets of truth-conditions are equivalent
[Frege, by Potter]
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18937
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If sentences have a 'sense', empty name sentences can be understood that way
[Frege, by Sawyer]
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9180
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Holism says all language use is also a change in the rules of language
[Frege, by Dummett]
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15597
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Frege's Puzzle: from different semantics we infer different reference for two names with the same reference
[Frege, by Fine,K]
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17002
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Frege's 'sense' is ambiguous, between the meaning of a designator, and how it fixes reference
[Kripke on Frege]
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18778
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Every descriptive name has a sense, but may not have a reference
[Frege]
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7805
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Frege started as anti-realist, but the sense/reference distinction led him to realism
[Frege, by Benardete,JA]
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15155
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Expressions always give ways of thinking of referents, rather than the referents themselves
[Frege, by Soames]
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11126
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'Sense' gives meaning to non-referring names, and to two expressions for one referent
[Frege, by Margolis/Laurence]
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8164
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Frege was the first to construct a plausible theory of meaning
[Frege, by Dummett]
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9817
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Earlier Frege focuses on content itself; later he became interested in understanding content
[Frege, by Dummett]
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8171
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Frege divided the meaning of a sentence into sense, force and tone
[Frege, by Dummett]
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4954
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Frege uses 'sense' to mean both a designator's meaning, and the way its reference is determined
[Kripke on Frege]
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7304
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Frege explained meaning as sense, semantic value, reference, force and tone
[Frege, by Miller,A]
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18773
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People may have different senses for 'Aristotle', like 'pupil of Plato' or 'teacher of Alexander'
[Frege]
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4976
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The meaning (reference) of 'evening star' is the same as that of 'morning star', but not the sense
[Frege]
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4977
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In maths, there are phrases with a clear sense, but no actual reference
[Frege]
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4978
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The meaning of a proper name is the designated object
[Frege]
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4979
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We are driven from sense to reference by our desire for truth
[Frege]
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4980
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The meaning (reference) of a sentence is its truth value - the circumstance of it being true or false
[Frege]
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4981
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The reference of a word should be understood as part of the reference of the sentence
[Frege]
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18940
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It is a weakness of natural languages to contain non-denoting names
[Frege]
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18939
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In a logically perfect language every well-formed proper name designates an object
[Frege]
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