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Single Idea 15599

[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive ]

Full Idea

There may be a semantic relationship between 'Cicero' and 'Cicero' that does not hold between 'Cicero' and 'Tully', despite the lack of an intrinsic semantic difference between the names themselves.

Clarification

'Cicero' and 'Tully' are names of the same person

Gist of Idea

Cicero/Cicero and Cicero/Tully may differ in relationship, despite being semantically the same

Source

Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 2.E)

Book Ref

Fine,Kit: 'Semantic Relationism' [OUP 2007], p.51


A Reaction

This is the key idea of Fine's book, and a most original and promising approach to a rather intractable problem in reference. He goes on to distinguish names which are 'strictly' coreferential (the first pair) from those that are 'accidentally' so.


The 33 ideas with the same theme [names imply information about the object]:

Proper name in modal contexts refer obliquely, to their usual sense [Frege, by Gibbard]
A Fregean proper name has a sense determining an object, instead of a concept [Frege, by Sainsbury]
People may have different senses for 'Aristotle', like 'pupil of Plato' or 'teacher of Alexander' [Frege]
Any object can have many different names, each with a distinct sense [Frege]
Names need a means of reidentifying their referents [Bradley, by Read]
Russell admitted that even names could also be used as descriptions [Russell, by Bach]
Names are really descriptions, except for a few words like 'this' and 'that' [Russell]
Asking 'Did Homer exist?' is employing an abbreviated description [Russell]
Names don't have a sense, but are disguised definite descriptions [Russell, by Sawyer]
Russell says names are not denotations, but definite descriptions in disguise [Russell, by Kripke]
Russell says a name contributes a complex of properties, rather than an object [Russell, by Sawyer]
Are names descriptions, if the description is unknown, false, not special, or contains names? [McCullogh on Russell]
Treat description using quantifiers, and treat proper names as descriptions [Russell, by McCullogh]
Proper names are really descriptions, and can be replaced by a description in a person's mind [Russell]
A name is not determined by a description, but by a cluster or family [Wittgenstein, by Kripke]
Failure of substitutivity shows that a personal name is not purely referential [Quine]
Ancient names like 'Obadiah' depend on tradition, not on where the name originated [Dummett]
Names have a subjective aspect, especially the role of our own name [Derrida]
'I' is the perfect name, because it denotes without description [Derrida]
We may fix the reference of 'Cicero' by a description, but thereafter the name is rigid [Kripke]
A bundle of qualities is a collection of abstractions, so it can't be a particular [Kripke]
A name can still refer even if it satisfies none of its well-known descriptions [Kripke]
We don't normally think of names as having senses (e.g. we don't give definitions of them) [Searle]
How can a proper name be correlated with its object if it hasn't got a sense? [Searle]
'Aristotle' means more than just 'an object that was christened "Aristotle"' [Searle]
Reference for proper names presupposes a set of uniquely referring descriptions [Searle]
Proper names are logically connected with their characteristics, in a loose way [Searle]
We refer to Thales successfully by name, even if all descriptions of him are false [Schwartz,SP]
The traditional theory of names says some of the descriptions must be correct [Schwartz,SP]
Proper names can be non-referential - even predicate as well as attributive uses [Bach]
Cicero/Cicero and Cicero/Tully may differ in relationship, despite being semantically the same [Fine,K]
Part of the sense of a proper name is a criterion of the thing's identity [Hawley]
Maybe proper names have the content of fixing a thing's category [Bealer]