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Single Idea 15600
[filed under theme 19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
]
Full Idea
The standard referentialist semantics for a language with names is that the semantic value of the name is the object, the content of a predicate is a property, and the content of a logical connective is an operation on propositions.
Gist of Idea
Referentialist semantics has objects for names, properties for predicates, and propositions for connectives
Source
Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 2.F)
Book Ref
Fine,Kit: 'Semantic Relationism' [OUP 2007], p.53
A Reaction
My particular bęte noire is the idea that every predicate names a property. It is the tyranny of having to have a comprehensive semantic theory that drives this implausible picture. And I don't see how an object can be a semantic value…
The
26 ideas
with the same theme
[general ideas about assigning meaning to symbols]:
15788
|
Syntax and semantics are indeterminate, and modern 'semantics' is a bogus subject
[Quine, by Lycan]
|
16461
|
We still lack an agreed semantics for quantifiers in natural language
[Stalnaker]
|
16403
|
'Descriptive' semantics gives a system for a language; 'foundational' semantics give underlying facts
[Stalnaker]
|
12616
|
English has no semantic theory, just associations between sentences and thoughts
[Fodor]
|
2434
|
Broad semantics holds that the basic semantic properties are truth and denotation
[Fodor]
|
12645
|
Semantics (esp. referential semantics) allows inferences from utterances to the world
[Fodor]
|
12646
|
Semantics relates to the world, so it is never just psychological
[Fodor]
|
7872
|
Teleosemantics equates meaning with the item the concept is intended to track
[Papineau]
|
13965
|
Semantics as theory of meaning and semantics as truth-based logical consequence are very different
[Soames]
|
14618
|
Semantics is either an assignment of semantic values, or a theory of truth
[Fine,K]
|
14621
|
Semantics is a body of semantic requirements, not semantic truths or assigned values
[Fine,K]
|
15587
|
That two utterances say the same thing may not be intrinsic to them, but involve their relationships
[Fine,K]
|
15589
|
The two main theories are Holism (which is inferential), and Representational (which is atomistic)
[Fine,K]
|
15596
|
The standard aim of semantics is to assign a semantic value to each expression
[Fine,K]
|
15598
|
We should pursue semantic facts as stated by truths in theories (and not put the theories first!)
[Fine,K]
|
15600
|
Referentialist semantics has objects for names, properties for predicates, and propositions for connectives
[Fine,K]
|
15601
|
Fregeans approach the world through sense, Referentialists through reference
[Fine,K]
|
19534
|
How does inferentialism distinguish the patterns of inference that are essential to meaning?
[Williamson]
|
19535
|
Internalist inferentialism has trouble explaining how meaning and reference relate
[Williamson]
|
19533
|
Inferentialist semantics relies on internal inference relations, not on external references
[Williamson]
|
18038
|
The 't' and 'f' of formal semantics has no philosophical interest, and may not refer to true and false
[Williamson]
|
18791
|
In 'situation semantics' our main concepts are abstracted from situations
[Mares]
|
19538
|
Entailment is modelled in formal semantics as set inclusion (where 'mammals' contains 'cats')
[Dougherty/Rysiew]
|
18053
|
The semantics of a sentence is its potential for changing a context
[Magidor]
|
14720
|
Semantic theory assigns meanings to expressions, and metasemantics explains how this works
[Schroeter]
|
17732
|
Success semantics explains representation in terms of success in action
[Jenkins]
|