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Single Idea 15602

[filed under theme 18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files ]

Full Idea

Mental files should be seen as a device for keeping track of when objects are coordinated (represented as-the-same) and, rather than understand coordination in terms of mental files, we should understand mental files in terms of coordination.

Gist of Idea

Mental files are devices for keeping track of basic coordination of objects

Source

Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 3.A)

Book Ref

Fine,Kit: 'Semantic Relationism' [OUP 2007], p.68


A Reaction

Personally I think that the metaphor of a 'label' is much closer to the situation than that of a 'file'. Thus my concept of Cicero is labelled 'Tully', 'Roman', 'orator', 'philosophical example'... My problem is to distinguish the concept from its labels.


The 24 ideas with the same theme [mind is like a filing system, with labelled folders]:

Many memories make up a single experience [Aristotle]
Memories are preserved separately, according to category [Augustine]
Words are not for communication, but as marks for remembering what we have learned [Hobbes]
We need definitions to cram retrievable sense into a signed receptacle [Frege]
We use signs to mark receptacles for complex senses [Frege]
Puzzled Pierre has two mental files about the same object [Recanati on Kripke]
Mental representations name things in the world, but also files in our memory [Fodor]
We think in file names [Fodor]
There is a single file per object, memorised, reactivated, consolidated and expanded [Papineau, by Recanati]
An identity statement aims at getting the hearer to merge two mental files [Lockwood]
Mental files are devices for keeping track of basic coordination of objects [Fine,K]
Files can be confused, if two files correctly have a single name, or one file has two names [Recanati]
Encylopedic files have further epistemic links, beyond the basic one [Recanati]
Singular thoughts need a mental file, and an acquaintance relation from file to object [Recanati]
Expected acquaintance can create a thought-vehicle file, but without singular content [Recanati]
An 'indexed' file marks a file which simulates the mental file of some other person [Recanati]
Reference by mental files is Millian, in emphasising acquaintance, rather than satisfaction [Recanati]
The reference of a file is fixed by what it relates to, not the information it contains [Recanati]
A mental file treats all of its contents as concerning one object [Recanati]
There are transient 'demonstrative' files, habitual 'recognitional' files, cumulative 'encyclopedic' files [Recanati]
Files are hierarchical: proto-files, then first-order, then higher-order encyclopedic [Recanati]
A file has a 'nucleus' through its relation to the object, and a 'periphery' of links to other files [Recanati]
Mental files are concepts, which are either collections or (better) containers [Recanati]
The Frege case of believing a thing is both F and not-F is explained by separate mental files [Recanati]