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Single Idea 15652

[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic ]

Full Idea

The reduction of 2nd-order theories (of properties or sets) to axiomatic theories of truth may be conceived as a form of reductive nominalism, replacing existence assumptions (for comprehension axioms) by ontologically innocent truth assumptions.

Gist of Idea

We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties

Source

Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1.1)

Book Ref

'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.3


A Reaction

I like this very much, as weeding properties out of logic (without weeding them out of the world). So-called properties in logic are too abundant, so there is a misfit with their role in science.


The 22 ideas with the same theme [overview of what must exist to enable logic]:

Our research always hopes that reality embodies the logic we are employing [Peirce]
Logic is a fiction, which invents the view that one thought causes another [Nietzsche]
Logicians presuppose a world, and ignore logic/world connections, so their logic is impure [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
Phenomenology grounds logic in subjective experience [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
Logic is concerned with the real world just as truly as zoology [Russell]
Logic can be known a priori, without study of the actual world [Russell]
Logic can only assert hypothetical existence [Russell]
Logic is highly general truths abstracted from reality [Russell, by Glock]
Russell unusually saw logic as 'interpreted' (though very general, and neutral) [Russell/Whitehead, by Linsky,B]
The only classes are things, predicates and relations [Russell]
The propositions of logic are analytic tautologies [Wittgenstein]
Whether a modal claim is true depends on how the object is described [Quine, by Fine,K]
Logical languages are rooted in ordinary language, and that connection must be kept [Quine]
Unfashionably, I think logic has an empirical foundation [Putnam]
Logicians like their entities to exhibit a maximum degree of purity [Kaplan]
Logical space is abstracted from the actual world [Stalnaker]
Logic is a mathematical account of a universe of relations [Badiou]
A sentence can't be a truth of logic if it asserts the existence of certain sets [Boolos]
In first-order we can't just assert existence, and it is very hard to deny something's existence [Bach]
Either logic determines objects, or objects determine logic, or they are separate [Shapiro]
Maybe mathematical logic rests on information-processing [Ladyman/Ross]
We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach]