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Single Idea 15668

[filed under theme 19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 3. Meaning as Speaker's Intention ]

Full Idea

On Habermas's view, meanings are not determined by the speaker's relation to the external world, but by his relation to his interlocutors; meaning is essentially intersubjective.

Gist of Idea

Meaning is not fixed by a relation to the external world, but a relation to other speakers

Source

report of Jürgen Habermas (The Theory of Communicative Action [1981]) by James Gordon Finlayson - Habermas Ch.3:38

Book Ref

Finlayson,James G.: 'Habermas' [OUP 2005], p.38


A Reaction

This view is not the same as Grice's, but it is clearly much closer to Grice than to (say) the Frege/Davidson emphasis on truth-conditions. I'm not sure if I would know how to begin arbitrating between the two views!


The 9 ideas with the same theme [meaning is what speaker's want to communicate]:

Language co-exists with consciousness, and makes it social [Marx/Engels]
When I utter a sentence, listeners grasp both my meaning and my state of mind [Ryle]
Meaning needs an intention to induce a belief, and a recognition that this is the speaker's intention [Grice]
Only the utterer's primary intention is relevant to the meaning [Grice]
We judge linguistic intentions rather as we judge non-linguistic intentions, so they are alike [Grice]
Meaning is not fixed by a relation to the external world, but a relation to other speakers [Habermas, by Finlayson]
It seems unlikely that meaning can be reduced to communicative intentions, or any mental states [Fodor]
Grice thinks meaning is inherited from the propositional attitudes which sentences express [Fodor]
If meaning is speaker's intentions, it can be reduced to propositional attitudes, and philosophy of mind [McGinn]