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Single Idea 15681

[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence ]

Full Idea

We map types of essentialism by asking is it in the world or in our representations, is it sortal or causal or ideal, and is it specific particulars or placeholders for the unknown?

Gist of Idea

Essentialism: real or representational? sortal, causal or ideal? real particulars, or placeholders?

Source

Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 01 'Prelims')

Book Ref

Gelman,Susan A.: 'The Essential Child' [OUP 2005], p.8


A Reaction

I am struck by the way that this practising experimental psychologist gets to ask questions and make distinctions much more extensively than most armchair philosophers on the subject. She focuses on the representational, causal, placeholder view.


The 17 ideas with the same theme [distinctions about how essence should be understood]:

Only universals have essence [Plato, by Politis]
Aristotelian essences are causal, not classificatory [Aristotle, by Witt]
An essence can either be universal (in the mind) or singular (in concrete particulars) [Avicenna, by Panaccio]
Specific individual essence is defined by material, and generic essence is defined by form [Aquinas]
Avicenna and Duns Scotus say essences have independent and prior existence [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
Locke may distinguish real essence from internal constitution, claiming the latter is knowable [Locke, by Jones,J-E]
'Individual essences' fix a particular individual, and 'kind essences' fix the kind it belongs to [Ellis]
For Kripke, essence is origin; for Putnam, essence is properties; for Wiggins, essence is membership of a kind [Kripke, by Mautner]
Does Socrates have essential properties, plus a unique essence (or 'haecceity') which entails them? [Plantinga]
Aristotelian and Kripkean essentialism are very different theories [Witt]
Essences are either taken as real definitions, or as necessary properties [Fine,K]
How do we distinguish basic from derived esssences? [Fine,K]
Maybe some things have essential relationships as well as essential properties [Fine,K]
Causal reference presupposes essentialism if it refers to modally extended entities [Sidelle]
Essentialism: real or representational? sortal, causal or ideal? real particulars, or placeholders? [Gelman]
Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA]
Modern views want essences just to individuate things across worlds and times [Koslicki]