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Full Idea
Properties that enter into causally meaningful links are better remembered and are treated as more central to the category than properties that are not causally meaningful.
Gist of Idea
Causal properties are seen as more central to category concepts
Source
Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 05 'Causation2')
Book Ref
Gelman,Susan A.: 'The Essential Child' [OUP 2005], p.116
A Reaction
This is a summary of considerable psychological research. This account not only sounds plausible, but would fit better withy why we form concepts and categories in the first place. We are trying to relate to the causations of nature.
| 9948 | Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 12654 | You can't think 'brown dog' without thinking 'brown' and 'dog' [Fodor] |
| 12609 | Concepts have distinctive reasons and norms [Peacocke] |
| 15690 | Causal properties are seen as more central to category concepts [Gelman] |
| 11140 | Concept-structure explains typicality, categories, development, reference and composition [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 18566 | Concepts should contain working memory, not long-term, because they control behaviour [Machery] |
| 18584 | One hybrid theory combines a core definition with a prototype for identification [Machery] |
| 18585 | Heterogeneous concepts might have conflicting judgements, where hybrid theories will not [Machery] |
| 18578 | Concepts as definitions was rejected, and concepts as prototypes, exemplars or theories proposed [Machery] |